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Deadly conflict in Central Kalimantan 
An explosion of violence in Kalimantan in late February shook the entire province of Central 
Kalimantan. Thousands of Dayaks, armed with machetes and home-made spears, hunted down 
migrants from the island of Madura, killing at random and destroying entire villages. The violence, 
prompted by years of unresolved social conflicts, destroyed hundreds of homes and decapitated bodies 
were strewn along the roadside. Two years earlier, a similar eruption shook West Kalimantan. 
This time the violence erupted in Sampit, the largest timber 
port in Indonesia. Sampit is a typical, red-necked frontier 
town where relations between the local population and 
newcomers have long been tense. As with conflicts else-
where in Indonesia, it started with a rather trivial dispute 
about the dismissal of two government officials. On the 
night of 17 February, a Dayak house was reportedly burned 
down. As word spread that Madurese were responsible, a 
gang of Dayak youths attacked a Madurese neigbourhood. 
In less than two weeks, the Dayaks had killed 469 people 
though observers believe that at least 1,000 Madurese lives 
were lost and 30,000 were forced to leave Central 
Kalimantan. 
Jakarta's tardy response 
When the violence erupted, President Wahid was just 
about to leave for the Middle East on a tour that would take 
him to several Arab countri,es and to Mecca for the haj . He 
ignored pleas to cancel the trip. As for Vice-President 
Megawati, it was nearly two weeks before she made a visit 
to the stricken region, heavily protected by 15 companies of 
special police and 4,000 troops. By then, the violence had 
subsided sufficiently for her to make a 30-minute visit to a 
refugee camp in Sampit. By then, calm had been restored 
because most of the Madurese had sought sanctuary in camps 
or left for Java. Other districts in the province refused to 
receive the Madurese, fearing that violence would follow. 
The local authorities in Barito Utara, the location of 
Suharto's disastrous one-million hectare swamp rice project, 
started recording the ethnic origin of settlers and transmi-
grants; all Madurese were instructed to leave by 2 March. 
The Madurese had become victims of ethnic cleansing. 
When he did return home, President Wahid made a brief 
visit to Central Kalimantan which led to another trail of 
violence. The moment he left Sampit, an incident happened 
in which riot police and Dayak protestors were killed and a 
protest gathering in Palangkaraya was fired on by troops 
killing at least five people 
Recent experience has shown that the government takes 
great pride in organising ceremonies or visits of ministers, 
but when it comes to resolving conflicts or even maintain-
ing law and order, the security forces have a record of utter 
failure, combined with deliberate neglect. 
C. Kalimantan, a place of extremes 
Central Kalimantan is in every sense a place of extremes, 
where poverty, hardship and the struggle for survival is 
harsh. The latest bout of violence exemplifies these prob-
lems. The local economy depends on timber and planta-
tions. The district of Kotawaringin Timur, of which Sampit 
is the capital, covers about 5 million hectares, nearly all of 
which was forest thirty years ago. Now only 2.7 million 
hectares is designated 'forest land'. The rest has been turned 
into agricultural land, plantations, settlements or unproduc-
tive scrub and grassland. Only 0.5 million hectares is clas-
sified as 'protected forest' and local people are prohibited by 
law from using this to make a living. Over 1 million 
hectares of the remaining forest is due to be converted to 
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estate crops. Illegal logging is rife and the forests will be 
commercially logged out within ten years. The Dayaks have 
little to show for the forests they have lost and most now 
live below the official poverty line. 
A thriving port town, Sampit is the centre of the legal and 
illegal timber industry and the trading and administrative 
centre of the province. Almost all these activities are domi-
nated by outsiders. Sampit has the air of a booming frontier 
town but for all its apparent wealth, its infrastructure is 
poor; electricity supply is intermittent and there is a lack of 
clean drinking water. The only asphalt road, running from 
Palangkaraya to Pangkalanbun, is in a state of disrepair, due 
to the heavy traffic of logging trucks. Sampit's 'get rich 
quick' atmosphere attracts migrants. Corruption is wide-
spread. The local police who used to levy a 10% tax on 
tourists are now said to be soliciting levies from refugees 
desperate to leave Kalimantan. 
Ongoing conflict 
destroyed or torched. 
Violent confrontations 
between the indigenous 
Dayak and Madurese 
settlers in Kalimantan 
have erupted for decades. 
They occurred under 
Sukarno and intensified 
during the Suharto era, 
reaching a new level of 
horror under Wahid's 
government. 
Kotawaringin Timur 
suffered a bout of violence 
last December, in the 
village of Kareng Pangi, 
subdistrict Katingan Hilir, 
some 200 km from 
Sampit. A minor dispute 
about a gambling centre 
led to a full-scale attack on 
the Madurese. Many 
homes and vehicles were 
In late 1996/early 1997, violence between these two 
communities caused at least 600 deaths. The conflict, now 
referred to as the Sanggau Ledo (a Madurese settlement) 
Tragedy, was widely reported in the national and interna-
tional press. The Economist of 15 February 1997 reported 
that"driving inland from the west coast of Kalimantan is 
like entering a war zone' Three years later, 40,000 Madurese 
refugees were still living in wretched conditions in 'tempo-
rary' camps in West Kalimantan's provincial capital, 
Pontianak [see also TAPOL Bulletin No. 139 & 140, 
February and April 1997]. 
In March 1999, while waves of violence were rippling 
across Maluku and West Java, West Kalimantan also had its 
share of trouble in Sambas. On that occasion, Malays joined 
forces with the Dayaks to target the Madurese. The district 
of Sambas has a population of 800,000, of which about 
eight per cent were Madurese. The official death toll was 
200 but observers believe that many more people died. [See 
also TAPOL Bulletin No. 152, May 1999]. 
In all the conflicts up until 1999, Madurese vigilante groups 
fought fierce battles against the locals but in the latest blood-
bath the Madurese were defenceless victims and entire fami-
lies ~ere butchered by rampaging indigenous Dayaks. 
The worst incident occurred when several hundred 
Madurese who had taken refuge in the forest were persuaded 
by local officials to be trucked down to the harbour, u~der 
police protection. A Dayak mob got wind of the evacuation, 
diverted the trucks to a field and persuaded the police and 
officials to hand over the human cargo. The police fled, and 
in less than an hour, 118 Madurese had been slain. 
Resolving conflicts, military style 
The social, political, cultural and economic roots of the 
conflict have remained unresolved. Typically, the killings 
stop once the newcomers have been driven out A well-
publicised peace ceremony of government officials and 
prominent leaders of the two communities is held. Military 
chiefs recruit a few elders to sign a peace accord, accompa-
nied by some photogenic rituals and everyone goes home, 
satisfied with a good day's work. A peace monument erected 
after the 1979 conflict was symbolically demolished in the 
1997 violence. Impunity has been total, and none of the 
killers have been brought to justice. 
One new factor that has become very evident in the post-
Suharto period is the shameful inability of the security 
forces to deal with unrest. During the New Order, the mili-
tary relied on the prevailing fear among the population to 
keep the lid on discontent. But nowadays the discredited 
image of both TNI (the armed forces) and POLRI (the 
police force) and the absence of the rule of law has meant 
that there are no law enforcement agencies capable of 
protecting citizens. 
The ineptitude of the security apparatus in dealing with 
the unrest in Central Kalimantan is a measure of the sheer 
scale of the problems Indonesia is facing. Thirty thousand 
troops are now stationed in Aceh, about fourteen battalions 
are tied up controlling the security situation in Maluku, an 
unknown number of troops are stationed in West Papua and 
tens of thousands of troops are being kept ready to cope 
with street demonstrations across Java. 
Moreover, the decision to shift responsibility for law and 
order from the army to POLRI has created its own prob-
lems. The police lack the capacity to deal with emergency 
situations like the violence in Central Kalimantan. 
Harrowing stories from Madurese survivors confirmed the 
ineffectiveness of the police. The Madurese were told to 
discard their weapons but when a huge force of Dayak vigi-
lantes arrived, the police stood by and did nothing to halt 
the atrocities. Corruption is rife within the army and the 
police and is often a source of conflict between the two 
forces. Police officers profiteered from the fleeing 
Madurese by buying up their household goods cheaply. 
Another racket, demanding transport money from fleeing 
Madurese as they boarded marine ships created a conflict 
between TNI and POLRI. 
The failure of policing during the Central Kalimantan 
tragedy has been used by army top brass to press for the 
army to resume responsibility for internal security; they 
have even asked parliament to introduce 'transitional' legis-
lation to formalise this shift. 
Dayaks and Madurese, both marginalised 
Central Kalimantan is the poorest of the three provinces 
into which Indonesia's part of Borneo is divided. In all parts 
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ofKalimantan, the Dayaks and Madurese are competing for 
scarce economic resources, so much of which has been 
plundered by Jakarta. 
Dayak is the generic name for at least 50 linguistically-
related groups all over the island of Borneo, including the 
northern part which belongs to Malaysia. The Dayaks have 
widely divergent social structures and value systems and 
are the most marginalised group on the island. Exploitation 
of Kalimantan's rich natural resources, its forests and 
minerals, has sidelined the Dayaks. Mining companies, 
Madurese refugees fleeing Central Kalimantan 
logging companies, state and private plantations, have all 
joined the scramble. The labour force has been brought in 
from elsewhere, often Madurese, while the informal busi-
ness sector, including public transport companies, are all in 
the hands of non-Dayaks. The Dayaks are not able to make 
a living from agro-forestry or small-scale logging once the 
logging companies have stripped all the valuable timber, 
especially once plantation companies move in to clear up 
the mess. The commercial loggers and oil palm estates 
which replace them prefer to use migrant labour rather than 
employ Dayaks. 
The Madurese migrants originate from the small island of 
Madura off the north-east coast of Java. A shortage of arable 
land has forced Madurese to migrate and many have gone 
to Kalimantan. This has been going on since the sixties so 
they are now into the third generation. They were born in 
Kalimantan and have never lived, or perhaps even visited, 
their island of origin. Strictly speaking, the Madurese are 
not the mercantile class because most of the lucrative busi-
ness enterprises are in the hands of Chinese or Malay 
traders. Some Madurese have emerged as small traders in 
the cities but their role is marginal. 
As is often the case elsewhere in the world, marginalised 
communities have a lot in common with each other but their 
conflicting positions on the lowest rung of the ladder all too 
often set them on a collision course. The Dayaks have an 
animist tradition but many have been converted to 
Christianity while Madurese cling to their Muslim beliefs. 
The transmigration programmes and subsequent waves of 
migrants which brought many Madurese to Kalimantan 
have created pockets of Madurese settlements, making it 
virtually impossible to create a multi-ethnic community 
enjoying social interaction. 
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Development Suharto-style 
The Dayaks, the customary landowners, became the victim 
of pembangunan, Suharto-style development schemes. 
Powerful business interests in Jakarta and the West were 
showered with lucrative concessions. The Dayaks were 
systematically robbed of their land and resource rights and 
had no recourse to legal action to defend their rights since, 
under Indonesian law, forests belong to the state. 
Tropical rainforest was turned into plywood, veneers and 
sawn timber for export in the name of development. Large 
timber companies made substantial profits and moved on to 
invest in plantations, banking and real estate, becoming 
giant conglomerates. The natural wealth of Kalimantan 
flowed through the hands of Suharto's family and their 
business cronies and helped to fuel Indonesia's economic 
boom which lasted until the mid 1990s. 
Much has changed in Indonesia since the Asian economic 
collapse, the fall of Suharto and a new democratically 
elected government, but the model of economic wealth 
driven by the ruthless exploitation of natural resources 
remains intact. Under new regional autonomy legislation, 
districts must raise sufficient income from their natural 
resources to finance public services; support the bureau-
cracy, cream off some profit for the local elite and send 
revenues to Jakarta. 
The international community has supported this. The IMF's 
'economic rescue package' promotes exports of timber, 
minerals and plantation crops such as palm oil to balance 
Indonesia's financial books. This includes paying off inter-
national creditors who were so keen to lend during the 
Suharto years. The World Bank funded Indonesia's transmi-
gration programme for years and, with the Asian 
Development Bank, supported an estate crop system which 
depends on transmigrant labour. 
Headhunters or a culture of violence 
The mobs of angry local youths who can be seen in widely 
distributed photographs bearing severed heads on spears are 
being portrayed as Dayak warriors, head hunters or savages. 
While they are the perpetrators of ethnic cleansing, they are 
themselves victims of the destruction of their ethnic identity. 
'Development' has eroded traditional lifestyles and under-
mined the authority of community leaders and offered 
young indigenous people little in return. The majority have 
had only a few years of primary education, due to the lack 
of schools and inability to pay school fees. They are ill-
equipped to compete with migrants and can only expect 
poorly-paid manual work and casual employment. 
Barbaric methods like severing heads on a mass scale are 
alien to Dayak traditions. These are methods frequently 
used in war situations as a tool to spread fear and terror 
among the population. The mass raping of women falls 
under the same category. Severing heads became part of the 
political scene in Indonesia in 1965, with the birth of the 
New Order. The severed heads of alleged communists in 
East Java in 1965 were often impaled as a warning to 
others. The Indonesian military employed this headhunting 
method frequently in East Timar. In 1999 an attack against 
alleged sorcerers in East Java, a Middle Age witch hunt, 
also engaged in headhunting. Decapitation is part of the 
culture of violence, nothing else. * 
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Human rights def enders slain in cold blood 
Peace agreements come and go but on the ground nothing ever changes in Aceh. The death 
toll has continued to rise, even following a mid-January accord for a one-month morato-
rium on violence. Volunteers working for a group to assist victims of torture were murdered 
in cold blood, in a deliberate move to curb the activities of human rights defenders. 
On average these days, there are at least three killings a 
day in Aceh, but it was the murder in cold blood of three 
volunteers working for RATA (Rehabilitation Action for 
Torture Victims in Aceh) that deeply shocked public opin-
ion and resulted in a condemnation by the European Union 
and the UN. 
RATA was inaugurated in Banda Aceh in September 1998 
by the governor of Aceh and the Danish ambassador, and is 
led by a former political prisoner, Drs Nurdin Abdulrahman. 
It is sponsored and largely financed by the Danish 
Government and is a member of the Copenhagen-based 
International Rehabil_itation Council for Torture Victims. Its 
volunteers work away from the spotlight, sending teams to 
provide counselling to victims and escorting victims to 
hospital when medical treatment is required. 
As this cold-blooded murder shows, the Indonesian secu-
rity forces regard the work of humanitarian workers and 
human rights defenders as dangerous because they are 
witnesses to what is happening on the ground. 
A well-planned attack 
The team that set out from Lhokseumawe in a vehicle 
clearly marked with the RATA insignia on 6 December to 
take patients in Tanah Pasir, North Aceh 
to a local medical centre consisted of 
three men and a woman, Idris bin Yusuf 
(27), Bachtiar bin Usman Daud (23), 
Nazaruddin bin Abdul Gani (22) and 
Ernita binti Wahab (23). The sole 
survivor, Nazaruddin, was able to tell the 
world what happened to his colleagues. 
He gave his testimony four days later, 
after going into hiding. 
Soon after the RATA team had escorted 
some patients to a medical centre in North 
Aceh, their vehicle was halted by three 
cars. A well-known cuak - army informer 
- named Ampson Thayeb who seemed to 
be in charge, ordered the volunteers out of 
their car. All the men in the three cars 
were heavily armed; some were cuak and 
the others were almost certainly soldiers 
not in uniform. The volunteers were ques-
tioned at gunpoint and stripped of their 
wallets and ID cards. They were asked about 
their RATA activities and accused of being 
pro-GAM, because they were operating in a GAM area. 
Nazaruddin and Bachtiar were ordered into one car, while 
Ernita and Idris were forced into the other cars. When the 
convoy stopped again, the volunteers were ordered out, told 
to take off their shoes and beaten. When they fell to the 
ground, shots were fired close to their feet. One of the 
abductors who was apparently a soldier was filming every-
thing with a video camera. 
A family in a house nearby who had watched the team 
being maltreated was ordered into one of the ca~s. The 
convoy then drove off again, and stopped several t1!11es at 
local koramil (military command posts) to chat with the 
soldiers. When Thayeb asked an officer, 'Should we finish 
them off here?' he was told to go and do it somewhere else. 
The convoy then approached a village where a bomb had 
just exploded; plenty of people were still milling around. 
The men in the convoy opened fire. As the people scattered, 
the kidnappers seized a man named Rush and order him 
into one of the cars. The convoy drove off again and later 
stopped in front of a school in Kandang. The volunteers 
together with Rusli were ordered out and told to 'confess if 
you want to survive'. Their hands were bound behind their 
backs. As one of the men thrust a gun into Ernita's mouth, 
she pleaded with them not to kill her. After driving off 
again, they were ordered out. Ernita and Idris were stood in 
front of a house. As the camera continue to whirr, the two 
were kicked to the ground and shot dead in the head, each 
with a single bullet. 
Meanwhile Nazaruddin had managed to loosen the cord 
Refugees from different parts of Aceh, an unresolved problem 
binding his hands and tried to do the same for Bachtiar. But 
as the men turned on them, he fled, escaping a volley of 
shots as he plunged through a nearby field, dressed only in 
his underpants. As he fled, he heard another two shots 
which killed Bachtiar and Rusli. Later that evening, he was 
taken in by a family in a village. 
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The following day, the bullet-riddled bodies of Emita, 
Idris, Bachtiar and Rusli were discovered near an empty 
house in Alue Liem, Bland Mangat sub-district, North Aceh 
by the Red Cross and taken away for identification and 
burial. Following the atrocity, RATA teams stopped their 
activities for two weeks but then resumed their work, except 
the team in Lhokseumawe which now has no vehicle. 
Koneksitas court could be convened 
A month after the atrocity, the National Human Rights 
Commission, Komnas HAM, announced that it would set 
up a special investigation commission known as a KPP 
HAM, under the terms of the law on Ad Hoc Human Rights 
Courts enacted by Parliament in November 2000. This 
should lead to the establishment of an ad hoc human rights 
court which would deal with the atrocity as a crime against 
humanity. If this actually happens, it will set an important 
precedent in Indonesian legal history, as the first case heard 
under the Human Rights Court Law. 
However, efforts are afoot to prevent this from happening. 
The details of the atrocity, which were made public within 
days by Nazaruddin, the sole survivor of the atrocity, also 
named some of the perpetrators, making it incumbent on the 
police inAceh to make arrests and start investigating the case. 
Among those who are now under arrest are Ampon Thayib 
and three others, all civilians. Leading the investigations is 
Chief Commissioner of Police, Drs Manahan Daulay who 
told human rights activists that there were eight suspects. He 
refused to identify the other four apart fromsaying that they 
were from the security forces, 'though not from the police'. He 
said that the investigation team was a joint koneksitas team 
including military investigators which means that the suspects 
will be indicted before a koneksitas court. 
This move has been roundly condemned by local human 
rights activists because such a court, in effect a military 
court, would not treat the atrocity as a crime against human-
ity and would deal only with the direct perpetrators, while 
those who ordered the kidnap and assassination operation 
would remain untouched. In a joint statement, the head of 
RATA, Drs Nurdin AR, and Iqbal Farabi, head of the 
Komnas HAM office in Banda Aceh, said: 'This case must 
not be taken to a koneksitas court. The RATA killing was 
clearly a crime against humanity, a grave, systematic and 
comprehensive crime, not just an incident. There are strong 
indications that this was a state-instigated crime with the 
deliberate aim of obstructing the work of humanitarian 
workers.' Investigations must expose the more senior mili-
tary officers who were in overall command of those who 
perpetrated the crime. 'This can only be done in a human 
rights court,' Iqbal said. 
By moving fast to set up koneksitas procedures, no doubt 
acting under pressure from the military, the police clearly 
want to pre-empt Komnas HAM intentions. A koneksitas 
trial would make it impossible to set up a human rights 
court subsequently because the principle of double jeopardy 
would foreclose the chances of holding a re-trial. 
The toll rises steadily 
The RATA killings occurred in a month when, according 
to one of Aceh's leading human rights' monitors, the number 
of victims has continued to rise. Kontras-Aceh, the 
Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence, 
announced in early January that they had been able to verify 
. . ACEH 
--- -
184 cases of killings, disappearances, torture and arrests in 
December. They stressed that this was not the complete 
story by any means, only cases where they had been able 
identify the victims, the perpetrators and the locations. 
Their local monitors were frequently obstructed in their 
work by the authorities. 
Their records included 88 deaths of which 35 were clearly 
the work of the security forces while 53 persons had been 
killed by unknown assailants. The killings were scattered 
right across Aceh. In North Aceh, there were 23 deaths, in 
Bireuen 21, in South Aceh 16 and in East Aceh 13. 
Altogether, according to Kontras-Aceh records, twenty 
people were still missing. 
Kontras-Aceh coordinator, Aguswandi, told the press that 
it was imperative for the Indonesian authorities to reverse 
their present policy of violence; he insisted that they should 
accept responsibility for the escalating number of victims. 
[Serambi Aceh, 4 January 2001] 
Petrus killings abound 
One of striking features of the current spate of killings is 
that in many cases, corpses are left lying on the road. On 
one occasion in mid December, local people discovered five 
bodies lying side by side. 
The director of Cordova, an NGO that focuses on social 
analysis and human rights, told a Jakarta daily: 'Today, we 
see a new type of violence in the style of mysterious 
murders (petrus) such as those committed during the 
Suharto years which were (on that occasion) applied on 
suspected criminals. Suddenly now in Aceh we have bodies 
placed deliberately in public places.' This made it difficult 
to believe the government when it says the violation of 
rights here can be stopped. 
Interviewed by The Jakarta Post, Otto Syamsuddin Ishak 
said, ' ... since June, we've been seeing more petrus cases in 
which the victims are mostly civilians.' 
Ishak is a member of the joint monitoring team for secu-
rity modalities that works within the framework of the Joint 
Understanding for a Humanitarian Pause to monitor viola-
tions of the accord between the Indonesian government and 
the armed movement, GAM. Asked which of the two sides 
were responsible for most of the violations, he said: 'Maybe 
both parties are guilty of violating the Pause .. . but both 
parties must be open to a transparent and comprehensive 
examination of rights violations.' This could be undertaken, 
he said, by an international NGO like Amnesty Inter-
national or by the UN. [Jakarta Post, 18 December 2000)* 
NEW BOOKS ON ACEH 
- ACEH, the untold story, Publ. FORUM-ASIA & 
SCHRA, December 2000 
- RUMOH GEUDONG, Tanda Luka Orang Aceh, 
Dyah Rahmany P., Publ. Terre des Hommes, Cordova 
& LSPP, January 2001 
- ACEH MERDEKA, Ideologi, Kepemimpinan dan 
Gerakan, Dr. M.lsa Sulaiman, Publ. Pustaka Al 
Kautsar, August 2000 
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All-out war in Aceh as US oil company halts operations 
Following a cabinet decision to brand GAM as a 'separatist movement', !he way.has been 
opened for the military to launch a major military operation in Aceh. T~is effectively ends 
efforts to enter into a truce with GAM and places the blood-soaked province on. a w~r fo.ot-
ing. Simultaneously, Exxon Mobil has halted operations because of the security situation 
and other major companies may soon close down as well. 
Until the Wahid Cabinet met on 12 March for an emer-
gency discussion about Aceh, efforts were still underway to 
reach truce accords between local field commanders of the 
Indonesian security forces, the TNI/Polri, and the armed 
forces of Aceh Merdeka, GAM. The Humanitarian Pause 
that was agreed last May had failed to end the violence; 
indeed the level of violence has continued to escalate 
throughout the time that the Pause remained in effect. 
After agreeing to a one-month moratorium on violence in 
mid January, the two sides agreed in mid February, during 
talks brokered by the Henri Dunant Centre in Switzerland to 
replace the Pause with locally-negotiated security arrange-
ments between field commanders on the ground. These 
tentative efforts to reach a truce, in line with the more 
conciliatory policy advocated by President Abdurrahman 
Wahid, were swept aside by the cabinet decision on 12 
March to formally brand GAM as a 'separatist movement', 
paving the way for 'limited military operations'. TNI's top 
brass had been saying for weeks that they needed such a 
declaration to provide 'legal grounds' for their plans to 
launch new military operations. Besides putting Aceh on a 
war footing, the decision represents a victory for the 
Indonesian military and a serious political setback for 
Indonesia's already beleaguered president. 
Military take over command 
Since early 2000, security operations in Aceh have been 
led by POLRI, the Indonesian police force, in an operation 
code-named Operasi Cinta Meunasah (Operation Love-the-
Mosque - Meunasah being a small Muslim place of 
worship). This operation has also involved the territorial 
troops in Aceh, along with non-organic troops brought in 
from outside; until now most of these non-organic troops 
have been Brimob (special police units) which are, like the 
army's special forces, Kopassus, notorious for their brutal-
ity. However, these operations have failed to end almost 
daily attacks on the security forces by GAM, resulting in 
many casualties for the army and the police. Military and 
police installations have been targeted on a regular basis by 
GAM, invariably leading to attacks on civilians in the coun-
tryside, where the death toll has been the highest. 
GAM operations have also largely paralysed local govern-
ment administration. In the districts of North Aceh, East 
Aceh and Pidie, three-quarters of the sub-district adminis-
trations are no longer functioning, while in other districts 
the situation is almost as grave in security terms for 
Indonesia. Aceh's chief of police said that police would 
'temporarily fill the district chiefs' positions that have been 
abandoned because of security threats. [Jakarta Post, 13 
March] 
A few days before the cabinet decided to launch new mili-
tary operations in Aceh, armed forces chief of general staff 
Lieut-General Djamari Chaniago, announced that troops 
from all over Java were undergoing special training at the 
Kopassus (special forces) training centre in Batu Jajar, 
Bandung, ready to be sent to Aceh. The training includes 
anti-guerrilla combat, control of the highways, operations in 
residential areas and anti-assault combat. [ Antara, 8 March] 
At the same time, the commander of the special strategic 
command, Kostrad, Lieut.General Ryamizard Ryacudu, 
declared that more of his forces would be sent to Aceh, and 
that two Kostrad battalions were already there. 'GAM is an 
enemy of the state,' he said, ' we must quell them all.' 
[Jakarta Post, 8 March] 
It is generally agreed that there are 30,000 Indonesian 
troops in Aceh, and recent reports suggest that an additional 
6,000 are about to be sent. This represents a huge drain on 
Indonesia's armed forces but makes it clear that the armed 
forces will stop at nothing to preserve Aceh as part of 
Indonesia. Armed forces chief of staff, General Endriartono 
Sutarto recently said: 'If there are only two options, to 
conduct a military operation or to lose the region, we (the 
TNI) will firmly choose the first option.' [Jakarta Post, 13 
March] 
Soldier guarding Exxon-Mobil site 
ExxonMobil halts operations 
Three days before the decision to launch new military 
operations, the US-owned oil-and-gas company Exxon 
Mobil announced that its operations were being halted 
because of the security situation. Exxon Mobil, formerly 
known as Mobile Oil Indonesia (MOI), operates the Arun 
gas fields and is Indonesia's main producer of natural gas. 
Based in Lhokseumawe, North Aceh, the company 
continued on page 7 
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continued from page 6 
accounts for 30 per cent of the country's total oil and gas 
exports. The company is part owned by Pertamina, 
Indonesia's state oil company. The gas produced by Exxon 
Mobil is processed into liquified natural gas ready for export 
to its main customers, Japan and South Korea, by PT Arun, 
also jointly owned by Exxon Mobil and Pertamina. On 13 
March, it was announced that sixty top-level Exxon Mobil 
personnel, half of them foreigners, were being evacuated to 
Medan while PT Arun has cut its output by 30 per cent. 
During the DOM (military operational zone) period 
through the 1990s, army torture centres were located on the 
company's grounds, resulting in the company being 
accused of involvement in human rights violations. In 
recent months, its aircraft have been hijacked and gun 
battles have occurred near the company's facilities. 
[Financial Times, 13 March] 
The other companies reported to be on the verge of halting 
operations are PT Pupuk Iskandar Muda (a fertiliser 
company), PT Asean Fertiliser, and PT Kraft Kertas Aceh, a 
pulp and paper company. [Dow Jones, 9 March] 
Exxon Mobil and the other companies are all designated 
as 'vital enterprises', meaning that they are at all times under 
heavy military guard; the presence of these companies is 
seen by the Acehnese as being a major cause of their suffer-
ings because these troops are frequently used against the 
local population. Although business operations are to be 
suspended, the troops will certainly remain in place to safe-
guard the installations. 
Already Jakarta is being forced to make alternative 
arrangements to supply its overseas customers, while news 
of the halt in operations helped weaken the rupiah, already 
battered by conflict over the presidency and regional 
violence. * 
continued from page 13 
development agency, CAFOD, in Suai, Adriano da 
Nascimento: "We are only human; we cannot forgive those 
who murdered and raped our families without them being 
made, somehow, to pay for their crimes. We need justice 
first, then we can work to be reconciled with those who did 
these things. Justice must come before reconciliation. " [The 
Universe, August 2000]. 
As part of the process of establishing the truth behind the 
human rights abuses and serious crimes which accounted for 
the lives of around one third of the population since 197 4, UN 
member states should also examine their own shameful role in 
helping to sustain the Indonesian military occupation of the 
territory for so long. * 
continued from page 24 
report of the US State Department was made public. The 30-
page chapter on Indonesia does not mince words about the 
failures of the Indonesian government on the human rights 
front during 2000, the year under review. 
'The human rights situation in Indonesia', it states, 'worsened 
steadily in 2000, mostly due to ethnic, social and religious 
strife in the country's most unstable provinces.' Despite the 
efforts of the government of President Abdurrahman Wahid 
to build on Indonesia's democratic transition of 1999 and 
expand basic freedoms, violence on the part of security 
CONTINUATION 
forces as well as by separatist groups and others resulted in 
widespread human rights abuses, it said. 
'The (Indonesian) government was ineffective in deterring 
social, interethnic and inter-religious violence that 
accounted for the majority of deaths by violence during the 
year.' It went on: 'Security forces were responsible for 
numerous instances of, at times indiscriminate, shooting of 
civilians, torture, rape, beatings and other abuse, and arbi-
trary detention in Aceh, West Timor, Irian Jaya (also known 
as Papua or West Papua), the Moluccas, Sulawesi and else-
where in the country.' [Reuters, 26 February] 
For the full text, please access http://www.state.gov 
/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000 * 
continued from page 20 
arrived and shot them without warning. [Jakarta Post, 21 
December 2000] 
Brimob attack prisoners in their cells 
As if the prisoners in Wamena had not suffered enough at 
the hands of their tormentors, members of the notorious 
Brimob gained access to their cells on 4 February and 
subjected the prisoners to severe beatings and other forms 
of torture. In a statement issued shortly after this atrocity, 
ELS-HAM described the injuries suffered by seven of the 
men who were kicked with jackboots, and struck with iron 
rods and rifle butts. Murjono Murip, a school-teacher who 
is one of the Panel members, was struck in the lower back 
and warned that if he failed to confess in court that he had 
instigated the violence in Wouma, he would have his nails 
pulled out and his nose cut off. The other six wounded men 
were all members of the Papua Taskforce. As TAPOL stated 
in its letter to the British government, calling for pressure 
on Jakarta to investigate the incident and punish those 
responsible, the Brimob attack 'was clearly aimed at intim-
idating the defendants into acknowledging the charges 
against them, for fear of further brutalisation'. * 
East Timorese refugees drawing by Donald Bason 
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A visit to the new East Timor 
Although this was my first ever visit to East Timor, it was like a homec~ming. Ev~rything I 
saw felt so familiar. Everywhere I went reminded me of some past t~rrzble ev~n~ in t'!e 21~ 
year ordeal of the East Timorese. And there were the charred remains of bull~ings in Dill 
and Manatuto, reminders if such were needed, of the bestiality of the Indonesian forces of 
occupation who had, until the referendum, proclaimed 'economic development' to be their 
lasting contribution to East Tim or's welfare. Carmel Budiardjo reports: 
My impression driving from Dili's tiny airport to the office 
of the NGO Forum was of people going about their daily 
business, without fear and with heads held high. The sight 
of UN vehicles everywhere was such a relief. The impres-
sive, Portuguese-style building, defiled for so many years to 
accommodate Indonesia's 'provincial' administration, was 
now emblazoned with the word, UNTAET, the UN 
Transitional Administration for East Timor. International 
agencies were in evidence everywhere, on name-boards 
outside buildings and the number-plates of vehicles on the 
streets. Shut your eyes for a moment, I sometimes told 
myself, and try to imagine what it was like when the 
Indonesian army ran the place. I was surrounded by 
concrete signs of the stunning victory of the East Timorese 
people who voted so convincingly for independence despite 
the reign of terror that engulfed their country, from the 
moment it was announced that the UN would conduct a 
ballot in 1999. 
But rather symbolically, when I arrived at the office of the 
NGO Forum, there was a power cut which I was told was 
virtually a daily occurrence in the capital with no one 
understanding why the new administration was unable to 
cope with the problem. Perhaps, they were not too bothered 
as UN offices have their own generators and you could 
drive through darkened streets during a power cut and see 
the two huge floating hotels where most international 
personnel live blazing in light. Already I was getting a 
glimpse of the glaring contrast in living conditions between 
the local population and the international community. 
By the time of my arrival in late November 2000, 
UNTAET had been in charge for more than a year. Although 
the rubble created by the Indonesian army's scorched earth 
policy had been cleared away, charred ruins were every-
where; 60 per cent of the buildings in Dili had been 
destroyed during Black September, after the ballot results 
were announced. In other towns and villages, the destruc-
tion was even worse, and as I was to discover, little had yet 
been done to rebuild homes and schools. According to the 
Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE), alto-
gether 80 per cent of East Timer's housing stock was 
destroyed in September 1999. When I travelled through 
Manatuto on my way to Baucau, the only building I saw 
that had been restored was the local UNTAET office. 
Everything else was in ruins. In a report published recently, 
COHRE lamented the fact that 'UNTAET has yet to adopt a 
housing policy, allocate sufficient resources or to appoint 
officials responsible for national housing reconstruction'. 
[Human Rights SOLIDARITY, February 2001] 
Sight-seeing . 
I had my first sight-seeing drive with Jim Dunn, an old and 
much-beloved friend the man who first gathered the 
horrific accounts fro~ East Timorese refugees in Lisbon 
about the mass slaughter in Dili on the day of the 
Indonesian invasion in December 1975. Jim was now in 
Dili on an assignment for the Serious Crimes Unit of 
UNTAET. He drove me along Dili's magnificent seafront 
round to the farthest point of the bay, over-shadowed by a 
highly visible statue of Christ on the headland which had 
been built by the occupiers as their 'special gift' to their 
colonial subjects. 
Carmel Budiardjo (centre), Arsenio Bano (left), Coordi-
nator of the NGO Forum and Kerry Brogan from the UN 
Human Rights Division. 
Earlier Jim drove me passed a formerly Chinese-owned 
shop and pointed to an armed UN police officer guarding 
the narrow alleyway. Recently, he told me, investigators had 
discovered a mass grave there, covered over with concrete. 
He said the seven victims buried there were known to have 
been killed immediately after the Indonesian invasion on 7 
December 197 5. This was a poignant reminder for him of 
an encounter with a Chinese family at this very spot, when 
they asked his help to flee before the invaders arrived. He 
was now driven almost by a sense of guilt that he had been 
unable to do anything for these hapless victims of 
Indonesian military brutality. When we met later, just 
before my departure, he was even more distressed, having 
discovered that two of the victims were a baby and a two-
year-o ld child. 
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When I got chatting to a taxi-driver on another of my 
drives around the city and asked him to take me to the Santa 
Cruz cemetery, he told me he took part in the demonstration 
on 12 November 1991. He drove me the whole length of the 
march from Motael Church and said that just before the 
shooting commenced, he climbed up onto the portal above 
the entrance to the cemetery. So he was one of those 
captured on the memorable photo taken on 12 November. 
Within minutes, he told me, he was shot in the back and 
later taken to the military hospital. He was taken from there 
by relatives, avoiding the fate of so many other wounded 
people who were killed on the day after the massacre. He 
bared his back to show me the wound and said a bullet was 
still lodged in his body. 
Baucau 
I travelled to Baucau along the spectacular coastal road 
from Dili, to attend the fourth APCET conference. [See 
below.] Baucau had suffered far less during the Black 
September days because Bishop Basilio Nascimento had 
kept up a dialogue with the local militia chief; as a result of 
which most buildings were unscathed. However, hundreds 
of Baucau families were forced to flee to West Timor and 
local people acknowledge that reconciliation could take 
time, if and when they return. 
Together with delegates from several countries, I took part 
in 'community immersion' organised by our APCET hosts, 
an excellent opportunity to meet local groups and learn 
about life after a year under UN control. It soon became 
obvious that the problems were wide-ranging and feelings 
of frustration were very deep. 
The local leadership of the CNRT, six men and two 
women, with Antonio da Costa as the leader, told us about 
the complex social problems they had inherited from the 
Indonesian occupiers. Most of the buffaloes in the country-
side were killed in the wave of terror after the ballot. 
Ploughing the fields was difficult without tractors or 
buffaloes, and many farmers have no seeds. Huge tracts of 
forest were cut down during the occupation, leading to soil 
erosion. In June 2000, there was a serious landslide affect-
ing a 12-km stretch which damaged many houses in Baguia, 
Fatumaca and Calicai. Where people have begun to produce 
food again, marketing is extremely difficult because there is 
no transport. I asked about the call from environmentalists 
for people not to cut down trees, to protect the remaining 
forests. Antonio said this was unrealistic because kerosene 
was far too expensive and timber was needed as fuel for 
cooking. With the economy in ruins, it was hard to persuade 
people to protect the environment. He said that farmers in 
Uatolari were successfully growing rice but were facing 
competition from imported rice. This would not be the only 
time I heard complaints about imports competing with local 
produce. 
They felt that 't~ 5 May 1999 agreement' with the UN was 
making it possible for the international community to 
remain in East Timor for too long. (In fact, the 5 May agree-
ment provided the framework for the ballot in August 1999; 
the UN administration of East Timor and the length of its 
stay in East Timor is now the subject of resolutions of the 
Security Council.) They wanted the UN to leave as soon as 
possible to give the Timorese the chance to run things for 
themselves. What shone through for me was that they are a 
proud people who fought the occupiers, spent time in the 
EASTTIMOR 
bush and ultimately led their people to victory and they 
were angry that they had no resources at their disposal, not 
a single vehicle to get them to work every day while every 
highly-paid UN official each a car at their disposal. 
Timorisation 
The reason for their impatience with the UN became clear 
when we met the former local CNRT leader, Marito dos 
Reis, who was recently appointed district chief of Baucau. 
Marito was arrested in 1984 and spent eleven years in 
Cipinang Prison, Jakarta. Now he was the district chief as 
part of a UN move to Timorise the administration. Three of 
the 13 districts, Baucau, Manatuto and Ailieu now have 
Timorese district heads. Marito did not hide his disappoint-
ment at the slowness in solving so many economic and 
social problems. Now that he was district chief, we asked, 
was he able to change things and help local NGOs and 
communities to get involved? Unfortunately not, he said, 
because he has no powers and must act according to 
UNTEAT rules which still do not give any powers to the 
district chiefs they have appointed. His budget only covers 
his salary and a UN vehicle put at his disposal. He had no 
idea how long this would continue but there was no doubt 
from what he told us that he knew very well what needs to 
be done - rebuilding schools, opening local clinics, repair-
ing the roads, providing transportation, supplying farm 
equipment. And we knew from our later discussions that 
there were plenty of groups and individuals eager to sort 
things out, provided they could lay their hands on essential 
facilities and equipment. 
What an indignity for Timorese to be playing second 
fiddle to UN bureaucrats, nothing more than a fig leaf for an 
administration run by ex-pats for whom East Timor is a six-
month stint, here today, gone tomorrow. As I heard so often, 
most of them know next to nothing about the country they 
now administer and according to what I frequently heard, 
make no attempt to learn. I was later told by the UN's 
second-in-command, Jean-Christian Cady, that it would 
'take time' to train East Timorese for jobs in the future civil 
service but district chiefs were being appointed and not 
allowed to do anything. Yet these are people whose skills 
and ingenuity had withstood Indonesian oppression for a 
generation. 
The local committee of OMT, the women's organisation, 
had a similar story to tell. They said that women in the 
villages needed help to start co-operatives and get involved 
in weaving but they were unable to visit the villages 
because there was no transportation. Health conditions are 
very bad and mortality rates for women at childbirth are 
very high. Women are also dying from infections caused by 
contraceptive implants that could not be removed because 
of the absence of medical professionals. Domestic violence 
against women is a serious problem and polygamy is wide-
spread. There is an UNTAET gender affairs officer in Dili 
but they had yet to feel the benefit of her presence. The aim 
of their organisation is to achieve equal rights and responsi-
bilities with men, to ensure that women occupy 30 per cent 
of the positions in the administration and on assemblies, as 
well as a position of equality within the family. On a posi-
tive note, they said that men's attitudes towards women had 
improved during the two and a half decades of Indonesian 
rule. 
With the help of funding from OXFAM, they have set up 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 161, March/April 2001 9 
EASTTIMOR 
- - -
a trammg centre for women to learn to use sewing 
machines. We visited the centre which was full of people. 
The next step would be, how to market the garments the 
women would be able to produce. 
Workers beginning to organise 
Back in Dili, one of my most memorable encounters was 
at Laifet, the Labour Advocacy Institute of East Tim or. The 
director and founder is Eusebio Gutteres, who holds a law 
degree from Indonesia. The office was small and sparse, 
just a table and a few chairs, a few shelves with hardly 
anything on them. The Institute had recently moved to these 
new premises and was clearly attracting a lot of attention 
from workers experiencing problems at their place of work. 
When I arrived, Eusebio was in discussion with several 
carpenters who had come for advice on how to set up a 
union. Inside, were other workers from newly-established 
unions. Eusebio told me that Laifet is not a workers' organ-
isation; it sees its role as being to support workers with 
advice on handling disputes, organising themselves and 
lobbying for good labour laws. The tradition of setting up 
unions is very new in East Timor as unions were strictly 
forbidden during the Indonesian occupation. 
As the level of economic and commercial activity intensi-
fies, an East Timorese working class is emerging. Although 
unemployment is extremely high, thousands are getting 
jobs, mostly in the unskilled sector. Many are working for 
UN agencies, international NGOs and foreign firms, mostly 
Australian, but working conditions are poor and wages are 
low in all these sectors, with the result that many disputes 
have occurred. At this early stage, said Eusebio, Timorese 
don't feel the need for unions unless disputes occur, when 
their thoughts quickly tum in that direction. However, jobs 
are so few and far between that those in work are often 
afraid to act for fear of losing their jobs. 
Eusebio had spent the previous evening in a lengthy discus-
sion with Joao Carrascalao, leader of the UDT party and 
minister for the infrastructure in the East Timor Cabinet. 
Several electricians working for the electricity supply 
company had just been sacked without notice but the minis-
ter was forced to admit that he knew nothing about it. His 
departmental chiefs were all ex-pats and no one had 
reported the case to him. He promised to investigate the 
matter within a week. However, a few days later, the four 
East Timorese ministers in the cabinet, including 
Carrascalao, announced their intention to resign if they 
were not given proper powers and responsibilities to run 
their departments. I was not able to discover how the minis-
ters' dispute was resolved but it was a vivid reflection at a 
much higher level of the frustrations expressed to us by 
Marito dos Reis in Baucau. 
The workers who had gathered to meet me came from 
several sectors: port workers, teachers and workers in the 
food and restaurant section. The teachers union, the ETTU, 
is still very small, with only three hundred members. It was 
founded in November 2000 and has devoted much time to 
discussions with the authorities about the chances of getting 
teacher training abroad. Each of the unions seemed to have 
won the support of unions in Australia or New Zealand. 
Laifet recently announced plans to hold a national trade 
union conference in February 2001. 
[For an excellent account of these early beginnings, see 
'The Labour Situation and Workers' Support Groups in 
Timor Lorosa'e' by Celia Mather, available on request for 
£5.00, from: c.mather@mcrl.poptel.org.uk.] 
Sahe Institute for Liberation 
The Sahe Institute for Liberation has a very well estab-
lished office and library in Dili. It is named after Vicente 
Reis Sahe a leader of Fretilin in the mid-l 970s who died 
' . 
not long after the Indonesian invasion, though the circum-
stances and time of his death have not been established. 
It was set up in Jakarta in December 1998 and was then 
known as the Sahe Study Club, set up by East Timorese and 
Indonesian activists. The Sahe Institute for Liberation as it 
is now known, devotes its energies to grass-roots conscien-
tisation, publishing pamphlets and books and organising 
seminars and discussion groups. It was set up with the 
intention of looking beyond the declaration of indepen-
dence to considering social, economic and political aspects 
of a future, independent East Timor. They have turned their 
attention in particular to the grassroots activities undertaken 
by Fretilin during 1974 and 1975, to combat illiteracy, 
develop agricultural co-operatives and build on traditional 
sources for healing and other social purposes. All these 
activities were halted during the Indonesian occupation but 
Sahe activists who visit the villages these days discover 
people who were involved in these activities in those days 
and are keen to take up such endeavours again. To popu-
larise these programmes, Sahe published a translation into 
Indonesian of the classic study of Fretilin by Helen Hill 
written in 1975. 
After the announcement in early 1999 that the people 
would be allowed to choose between accepting or rejecting 
Indonesia's offer of 'wide-ranging autonomy', Sahe 
published a pamphlet, Jebakan Integrasi (The Trap of 
Integration) exposing the true meaning of autonomy and 
distributed forty thousand copies throughout the country. 
This was a shining example of Sahe's efforts to take politi-
cal issues to the grassroots. 
The Sahe collective which includes several Indonesian 
activists is keen on building a conprehensive library about 
East Timor's independence struggle and the history of the 
Indonesian occupation and is keen to obtain material on this 
subject from TAPOL's archives and TAPOL Bulletins going 
back to 1974. 
Law courts 
I went to the Dili district court but unfortunately, no trial 
was in progress and the building struck me as devoid of any 
activity. Four district courts have been set up but serious 
crimes, that is to say, gross violations of human rights, will 
only be heard in the Dili court. In such cases, the panel of 
three judges will consist of two international judges and an 
East Timorese judge. 
It was a special pleasure to meet Jacinta C. da Costa who 
is the only East Timorese to have been appointed to the 
High Court of East Timar, alongside two international 
judges. The high court had not yet held a session. A case 
regarding a legal technicality should have been heard but 
had to be postponed because one of the two international 
judges had left the country. Although for professional 
reasons, she refused to say anything about cases under 
consideration, she made no secret of the fact that things are 
moving far too slowly and that dozens of people are being 
held in detention for far too long because the justice system 
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was not functioning well. She told me that 25 judges had 
been appointed, of whom six were women. 
APCET-4 
The fourth Asia Pacific Conference on East Timor was the 
event that had brought me to East Timor. APCET was set up 
in the mid-1990s to expand the international solidarity 
movement for East Timor to the Asia-Pacific region. The 
first three conferences, in Manila, Kuala Lumpur and 
Bangkok, had been disrupted by the host governments, at 
the bidding of the Suharto regime. 
At the Bangkok meeting, it was decided to hold the next 
conference in Jakarta but fast-moving events overrode that 
decision, so here we were in Baucau with participants from 
sixteen countries in the region as well as nearly thirty East 
Timorese representing a variety of NGOs. Our Filipino 
hosts certainly organised a splendid event and the decision 
to hold the conference in Baucau rather than in Dili made a 
very important political point by emphasising the need to 
pay attention to the wide scene in East Timor. The 'commu-
nity immersion' visits took delegates to Maliana, Maubara 
and Bobonaro in the western border region, to Baucau on 
the north coast and Uatolari in the south-east. The conclu-
sions from all the groups were much the same, as reported 
above, of a people confronted by daunting economic and 
social problems. 
The final Conference Statement directed a number of 
demands at UNTAET, calling on it to ensure free and equi-
table elections and to ensure 'an effective decision-making 
by East Timorese on all levels, including planning and 
implementation' and stressing the importance of trans-
parency as a necessary condition to ensure East Timorese 
participation. It also called on UNTAET 'to support the 
process of justice and reconciliation by strongly supporting 
the Serious Crimes Unit'. 
N eo-colonialism should be avoided 
A critically important point raised was the need to moni-
tor the activities of the IMF, the World Bank, UNTAET and 
bilateral activity 'to ensure that the independence struggle is 
not going to be replaced by a new neo-colonial system'. It 
came out firmly against an 'IMF./World Bank and neo-
liberal, economic-rationalist exploitation' and in support of 
an economic system 'beneficial to the majority of the East 
Timorese people' and one that protects the environment of 
East Timor. 
However, problems did arise during the final session when 
we discussed the mechanisms for consulting with East 
Timorese civil society and the NGO community which were 
now the partners for APCET, rather than the CNRT with 
whom it worked so closely in the old days. Once UNTAET 
has left East Timor and the country has a democratically 
elected government, there will need to be a shift towards 
civil society which is far more heterogeneous and complex 
than consulting with the resistance movement. 
I later discovered that some of the leading NGOs in Dili 
felt that they had not been properly consulted by the organ-
isers during the conference preparations. Steps to improve 
this situation will depend very much on how the ACPET 
steering committee handles this extremely important ques-
tion. Proper consultation will be the deciding factor in the 
future work of APCET. 
EASTTIMOR 
Timorese journalists hold congress 
East Timorese journalists met in Dili in December to hold 
their first congress after initiation of their association 
exactly one year ago. 
During the conference of (TLJA) Timor Loro Sae 
Journalist Association, a road in Dili was renamed Avenida 
da Liberdade Imprensa, Press Freedom Road. The 3-km 
road which runs from Becora to the old Mercado is the road 
on which Dutch journalist, Sander Thoenes, was killed by 
militia forces in September 1999. An engraved stone marks 
the spot where Thoenes, who worked for the Financial 
Times of London, was shot and his body mutilated. 
The road is dedicated to the nine journalists who were 
killed in East Timor while on duty there. They include 
Roger East, murdered in Dili on the day of the Indonesian 
invasion, and the five journalists, from Australia, New 
Zealand and the UK who were killed on 16 October 1975 in 
Balibo by a unit of the Indonesian army during an incursion 
from across the border in West Timor. 
A team of UN investigators has carried forward long-
drawn-out investigations of the Balibo killings and recently 
submitted a request to UNTAET to issue international arrest 
warrants against three soldiers suspected of being responsi-
ble for the deaths. The most senior officer likely to be 
indicted is Yunus Yosfiah, now a lieutenant-general. A 
captain at the time, he was in command of the unit which 
carried out the killings. Yunus Yosfiah spent a two-year stint 
as minister of information in the government of B.J. 
Habibie. The other two are another Indonesian soldier, 
Christoforus da Silva, and East Timorese Domingos Bere. 
Speaking at the ceremony to rename the road, Australian 
journalist Hamish McDonald, who has played a key role in 
investigating the Balibo killings, said that the Balibo inci-
dent is important to East Timor and Indonesia to understand 
'the beginnings of a pattern of impunity repeated in the 
following 25 years'. * 
East Timorese Dancer Drawing by Donald Bason 
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UNTAET slow to investigate crimes against humanity 
18 months ago, on 6 September 1999, dozens of men, women and c~ildren were brutally 
murdered by pro-Indonesian militias in the Suai Church compound in south-western East 
Timor in one of the worst massacres following the vote for independence on 30 Augu~t. The 
atrocity took place in front of hundreds of witnesses and there is an abundance of evidence 
identifying the killers and the Indonesian army officers who directed the slaughter, but not 
a single person has been tried for the crime against humanity committed that day. The sa"!e 
applies to many other cases. Serious questions continue to be asked about the UN's commit-
ment to criminal justice in East Timor. 
The international community has the primary duty to try 
those responsible for the Suai killings before an interna-
tional tribunal. However, the United Nations Transitional 
Authority for East Timor (UNTAET), together with the East 
Timor Transitional Administration (ETTA) headed by East 
Timorese and non-East Timorese cabinet members, also has 
a responsibility under its justice mandate to investigate and 
prosecute gross violations of human rights. 
To demonstrate that justice can prevail in East Timor, 
UNTAET must show a commitment to proceed against the 
militia commanders and the Indonesian officers behind 
them and not just the lower-ranking militiamen. It must 
also prosecute them for crimes against humanity in order to 
expose the systematic involvement of the Indonesian State. 
Unsatisfactory progress 
To date, UNTAET's performance has been far from satis-
factory due to its structural and bureaucratic weaknesses and 
an underlying lack of political will to pursue the perpetrators. 
Its investigations have been arbitrary and undermined by 
lack of resources, bad management and incompetence. 
Many people in Suai and elsewhere have no confidence in 
UNTAET's willingness and ability to deliver justice. 
Some initial problems were inevitable given that UNTAET 
was faced with the task of building the necessary legal and 
judicial institutions from scratch. However, much more 
progress could have been made if the UN had allocated more 
financial and human resources at an early stage, if it had 
adopted more simplified and flexible bureaucratic proce-
dures and delegated more authority to East Timorese people. 
The incompetence of the investigators derives not only 
from their lack of professional expertise, but also from their 
lack of local knowledge and sensitivity. Investigators 
should speak a language intelligible to the local people and 
properly understand the local community in order to facili-
tate effective communication with witnesses and build 
confidence in the judicial process. 
To that end, continuity is essential, but unfortunately has 
not been achieved because the overall authority for investi-
gations has changed several times. Initially, the task fell to 
UNTAET's civilian police (Civpol). The Civpol officers 
came from 50 different countries. In most cases, they did 
not speak a local language and their overall quality was low. 
They were initially recruited for just three months, which 
gave them no time to develop an understanding of the 
community in which they were working. 
The Civpol who were empowered to investigate the 1999 
crimes did not receive any training in investigating crimes 
against humanity until June 2000. Most Civpol treated each 
case as a routine homicide investigation, giving no attention 
to the systematic nature of the crimes and the role of the 
Indonesian State. Their short tours of duty meant that every 
new investigator tended to start the questioning of witnesses 
from scratch. Furthermore, Civpol's investigation unit was 
responsible not only for investigating the 1999 violence, but 
also for all ongoing ordinary crimes. This meant that atten-
tion to the 1999 crimes was often poorly focused. [see 
Human Rights Watch World Report 2001, chapter on East 
Timor, Dec. 2000.] 
The responsibility for investigations subsequently passed 
to the Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) established under the 
Office of Human Rights Affairs and later transferred to the 
Department of Justice of ETTA. The SCU is separate from 
Civpol and from the prosecution service, which now deal 
with ordinary crimes. It remains under-funded and under-
staffed and lacks basic necessities, such as proper transport. 
Much of the initial work carried out by the civpols has 
been wasted. Some now have a reasonable understanding 
of the local community and are keen to pursue cases, but are 
being prevented from doing so. Civpol in Suai are privately 
furious that they have been unofficially instructed not to 
arrest anyone for murder unless they can prove that the 
suspect was not forced to kill. This imposes on them the 
difficulty of proving a negative. In any event the question 
of whether the defendant was acting under duress is one for 
the court to decide and not the investigator. 
In relation to the Suai case, investigators from the SCU 
have spent very little time in the area and until recently have 
not treated it as a priority case. No attempt has been made 
to employ any of the many people who know precisely what 
happened in September 1999 to assist in the investigations. 
There is an urgent need generally to expedite the training of 
East Timorese police officers as recommended by the UN 
Security Council mission which visited East Timor in 
November 2000. 
The above problems have been exacerbated by delays in 
establishing the necessary legal framework and infrastruc-
ture for serious crimes investigations. UNTAET did not 
come up with an acceptable criminal procedure code until 
September 2000 and there are no proper prison facilities in 
many areas, including Suai. UNTAET has been forced to 
release suspects who have confessed to crimes, such as 
murder and rape, because of a lack of resources to pursue 
investigations. 
Cases addressed 
To date, the SCU has focused on five cases: a) the attack 
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on the Liquica Church compound on 6 April 1999; b) the 
attack on the house of Manuel Carrascalao on 17 April 
1999; c) the attack on the Maliana Police Station compound 
on 8 September 1999; d) a series of killings from April to 
September 1999 in Los Palos, including the killing of 
members of religious orders in September 1999, and the 
forcible transfer and deportation of the population; and e) 
gender related crimes, involving arbitrary arrest, unlawful 
detention and sexual violence, committed in Lolotoe, 
Bobonaro district from May to September 1999. 
There is no apparent strategic reason for the decision to 
concentrate on these cases and other cases should be 
pursued without delay. Otherwise, evidence will be lost, 
destroyed or damaged or will become unreliable with the 
result that fair and successful prosecutions will be impossi-
ble. Many shallow graves and wells throughout East Timor 
require urgent investigation. 
In the first successful prosecution, Joao Fernandes, a 
member of the Merah Putih militia group was found guilty 
of murdering a pro-independence activist in Maliana on 8 
September 1999 and sentenced to 12 years in prison. The 
sentence was supposed to reflect the fact that the defendant 
agreed to co-operate in providing evidence in other cases. 
His conviction was an important first step, but he was found 
guilty only of the ordinary crime of murder, not of a crime 
against humanity, which would have linked his crime to the 
wider policy of the Indonesian military to destroy East 
Timor after the ballot. 
In other developments, on 1 March 2001 , a member of 
Falintil, Julio Fernandes (no relation), was sentenced to 
seven years imprisonment for murdering a pro-Indonesia 
militiaman in September 1999. 
On 16 February, nine members of the Team Alpha militia 
group went on trial in connection with the Los Palos crimes. 
They are charged with killing 12 people, including three 
priests, two nuns and an Indonesian journalist, on 25 
September 1999. Another suspect, Lieutenant Sayful 
Anwar, an officer of Indonesia's Kopassus special forces is 
still at large in Indonesia, as well as a militiaman who is also 
now in Indonesia. The trial has been beset with problems 
such as a shortage of translators, missing records and inad-
equate funding, which should have been resolved ages ago. 
On 6 February, prosecutors filed charges against an 
Indonesian army officer and four pro-Indonesia militiamen in 
relation to the Lolotoe crimes. The indictments concern 
sexual offences and crimes of murder, torture and kidnapping. 
Balibo killings, a step forward 
In a separate investigation not under the auspices of the 
SCU, Civpol have gathered evidence concerning the 
murder of five Australian-based television newsmen at 
Balibo in October 1975. The victims included two 
Australians, a New Zealander and two Britons. The jour-
nalists were in Balibo to report on incursions from West 
Timor by Indonesian troops, two months before the 
Indonesian invasion of East Timor. Past investigations in 
Australia have failed to persuade the Australian government 
to make formal charges, while the British government still 
refuses to hold investigations into the deaths of two of its 
citizens. 
But now, East Timor's chief prosecutor, Mohamed 
Othman has said that there are grounds to continue with the 
investigation which could lead to an international arrest 
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warrant being issued for former Indonesian Information 
Minister, Yunus Yosfiah, amongst others; Yunus has been 
named as a suspect, having been identified as the army 
captain in charge of the unit that shot the journalists dead. 
However, the case can only proceed to trial if the investiga-
tors can produce sufficient evidence that a war crime was 
committed since the time limit for a prosecution for the 
ordinary crime of murder has expired. 
Crimes of sexual violence 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia recently ruled that mass rape and sexual 
enslavement in times of conflict can be regarded as crimes 
against humanity. This is a landmark decision with poten-
tially far-reaching implications for East Timor. 
It is becoming increasingly clear that crimes of sexual 
violence were widespread following the independence vote 
in August 1999. According to East Timor's leading 
women's organisation, Fokupers, militia members and 
soldiers connived 'to abduct women or share them like a 
chattel, or in some cases forcibly taking women across the 
border into West Timor where the women were raped daily 
and made to perform household chores'. As oflate last year, 
the organisation had documented 165 cases of 'gender-
based violations' in 1999, including 46 cases of rape, many 
committed in Suai. However, the actual total is likely to be 
considerably higher and violations are still continuing in the 
refugee camps in West Timor. The trauma experienced by 
women is often made worse by the fact that they are consid-
ered 'dirty' and ostracised by their communities. [Sexual 
Violence as Tool of War, New York Times, 1 March 2001]. 
UNTAET has been slow to respond to the need for a 
systematic investigation into crimes of sexual violence. 
Serious investigations into rapes as crimes against human-
ity began only in July 2000. One factor was the lack of 
women investigators. Less than four per cent of civpols are 
female and of the handful of women investigators, only one 
had special training in sexual offences. [see Human Rights 
Watch World Report, op. cit.] 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
On 28 February, the ETTA Cabinet endorsed a draft regu-
lation on the establishment of a Reception, Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission for East Timor which aims to 
expose the truth about human rights violations going back 
to 1974. The Commission will not have jurisdiction over 
serious crimes, which will continue to be dealt with by the 
normal justice system and the SCU. It is hoped that lesser 
crimes will be resolved through the Commission using 
community dispute resolution mechanisms. The decisions 
of the Commission will have the same degree of enforce-
ability as court orders. It is likely to start work in the 
middle of 2001 and will continue to function for two years. 
The Commission is being set up following consultations in 
the districts. However there is a clear nationwide consensus 
that it cannot be substitute for justice. 
The Commission will obtain a budget of $78 million and 
a staff of three hundred which far exceeds the amount 
invested in serious crimes investigations. The East Timor 
NGO Forum is concerned at this imbalance, and does not 
believe the Commission will help end the refugee problem 
in West Timor. Other complaints have been voiced by many 
in East Timor. In the words of a partner of the Catholic 
continued on page 7 
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Suharto-style trials back in fas hi on 
Less than three years after the fall of Suharto amid calls for 'ref ormasi ', there are serious 
signs that the democratically-elected government of Abdurrahman Wahid is slipping back 
into the bad, repressive ways of the Suharto dictatorship. In West Papua and Aceh, people 
who exercised their right to peaceful protest are facing charges that criminalise legitimate 
political protest. TAPOL has again called for these repressive laws to be repealed. 
Already under the transitional government of B.J Habibie, 
in power from May 1998 till October 1999, the authorities 
responded to strong pressure to release all political prison-
ers throughout Indonesia, including the many dozens held 
in Aceh and West Papua. The releases were completed soon 
after Abdurrahman Wahid took office on 20 October 1999 
and it was hoped that forthwith, no one would fall victim to 
charges under the anti-subversion law or the politically 
motivated articles in the Criminal Code known as the 'hate-
sowing' articles. 
However, these articles were not repealed and still worse, 
when the Habibie government decided in April 1999 to 
repeal the much-hated and widely-criticised draconian Anti-
Subversion Law, far from expunging from the statute books 
the most damaging, politically-motivated articles of that 
law, it incorporated them into the Criminal Code. So we 
now have an additional six articles, Articles 107a - 107f 
which were lifted from the anti-subversion law. These arti-
cles codify 'crimes' of a purely political nature such as 
'endangering the Pancasila' and 'promoting the spread of 
Marxism-Leninism'. 
In a letter to the new Minister of Justice and Human rights, 
Dr Baharuddin Lopa, on 1 March 2001, TAPOL called for 
the repeal of all these articles on the grounds that they 'should 
have no place in a state based on democratic principles'. 
Article 154 of the Criminal Code states that anyone who 
expresses 'feelings of hostility, hatred or contempt for the 
Indonesian Government', shall face a penalty of up to seven 
years. Article 154a states that 'anyone who besmirches the 
national flag and symbols of the state of the Republic of 
Indonesia' shall face a maximum penalty of up to four years'. 
Article 155 states that 'anyone who makes public, displays 
or hangs out writings or pictures in public places that 
contain feelings of hostility, hatred or contempt for the 
Indonesian Government for the purposes to making them 
known to the public' shall be liable to a maximum penalty 
of four and a half years. 
Article 160 states that anyone who 'in a public place, 
verbally or in writing, incites others to commit a crime, to 
use violence towards public officials or incites persons not 
to comply with laws or official instructions issued on the 
basis of the law' shall be liable to a penalty of up to six years. 
'Hate-sowing' in Aceh 
Muhammad Nazar has chaired SIRA, the Centre of 
Information for a Referendum in Aceh, since its establish-
ment in 1999. The organisation is dedicated to a peaceful 
struggle for a referendum on the status of Aceh and its future 
relationship with Indonesia. SIRA's first major action was to 
organise a mass rally in Banda Aceh calling for a referen-
dum in November 1999 attended by around a million people 
who had travelled from all parts of Aceh. The security forces 
made no attempt to prevent the rally and security was left to 
members of SIRA. The event passed off peacefully. 
Muhammad Nazar in the courtroom 
In August 2000, SIRA called on people not to raise the 
Indonesian national flag to mark the national day on 17 
August but asked them instead to raise the flag of the United 
Nations. The SIRA office was raided in the run-up to that 
event and UN flags were confiscated. In November, SIRA 
called on people to come to Banda Aceh to attend another 
pro-referendum rally on the first anniversary of the pro-
referendum rally in 1999. However, this time round, secu-
rity forces were out in force in all parts of Aceh, setting up 
road blocks and using armed violence to prevent hundreds 
of thousands of people from reaching Banda Aceh. Dozens 
of people were killed; Kontras-Aceh (Commission for the 
Disappeared and the Victims of Violence) was able to iden-
tify more than three dozen deaths but acknowledges that the 
death toll was probably far higher. The rally went ahead as 
planned but hundreds of thousands of people were 
prevented from attending. [See TAPOL Bulletin, No 160, 
November-December 2000] 
By this time, Nazar had been summoned for questioning 
by the police regarding the raising of the UN flag in August 
and was arrested on 20 November after being interrogated 
for a whole day. It was later announced that he would face 
charges under the 'hate-sowing articles' and he was trans-
ferred ~rom police custody to prison, to await trial. Although 
accordmg to the procedural code, the trial should be held in 
the place where the alleged 'crime' was committed, a deci-
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sion was issued by the then Justice Minister that the trial 
would take place in Medan, apparently on the grounds that 
there were not sufficient judges to hear the case in Banda 
Aceh. The decision was strongly condemned by his team of 
lawyers, his family and his associates in SIRA who warned 
against transferring him to Medan where Acehnese activists 
have been kidnapped and assassinated, most recently Jafar 
Siddiq Hamzah who disappeared in Medan last August and 
whose body was found three weeks later. 
The Nazar trial formally opened in Medan on 21 February 
but the defendant did not appear at the courthouse and the 
trial was adjourned. Shortly beforehand, Justice and Human 
Rights Minister Yusril Irzha Mahendra had been dismissed 
by President Wahid and was replaced by Baharuddin Lopa, 
who was secretary-general of Indonesia's National Human 
Rights Commission during its first years of existence. The 
new minister had made a last-minute intervention, rescind-
ing his predecessor's decision and decided that the trial 
should be held in the district court in Banda Aceh. 
In a letter to Justice Minister Baharuddin Lopa welcom-
ing the switch in venue, TAPOL said: 
' ... we believe that there is no justification for the trial of 
Nazar Muhammad to proceed. The defendant is being 
indicted for the peaceful exercise of his right to express 
views about the situation in Aceh. It is deplorable that he 
will face charges under articles 154, 155 and 160, the noto-
rious "hate-spreading" articles of Indonesia's Criminal 
Code. We would urge you to exercise your authority to 
press the Attorney General's office to drop the charges and 
order the unconditional release of the prisoner.' 
The trial was resumed in Banda Aceh on 8 March with a 
heavy security presence to keep hundreds of supporters at bay. 
'Hate-sowing' in West Papua 
On 5 February this year, five local members in Wamena 
of the Papuan Presidium Council went on trial at the 
Wamena district court. They were arrested on 13 Decemb_er 
last year, two months after the Wamena Tragedy (see sepa-
rate item) and have been accused of 'masterminding' the 
violence in Wamena on 6-7 October. The four men and one 
woman are: Rev. Obed Komba, Rev. Yudas Meage, Yafet 
Yelemaken, Murjono Murib, and Amelia Yigibalom. 
Although all the evidence suggests that they had tried to 
calm down the angry crowds and halt the violence, they 
have been charged under the three 'hate-sowing' articles, as 
well as under Article 106 which prescribes a maximum life 
sentence for attempting to commit 'separatism' and under 
Article 110 which prescribes a sentence of up to six years 
for 'conspiring to commit separatism'. On 10 March, they 
were sentenced to between four and four and a half years. 
Seventeen men also went on trial in Wamena for their 
alleged part in the violence on 6 - 7 October. Sixteen of the 
men, who are alleged to be members of the Papua Taskforce 
(Satgas Papua), faced charges under Article 214 which 
makes it an offence to use 'violence or threats of violence 
towards a state official' in collusion with two or more 
persons, punishable by up to seven years. They also face 
charges for the illegal use or possession of firearms under 
an emergency law of 1951 . The sixteen are: Yohakim Huby, 
Frans Huby, Heri Kosay, Hendrik Siep, Agus Sorabut, 
Jakson Itlay, Edi Marian, Timatus Kogoya, Pilius Wenda, 
Les Wenda, Atinus Wenda, Teri Wenda, Isak Wenda, Elius 
Wenda, Yoel Wenda and Yules Wenda. 
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The seventeenth man on trial is Sudirman Pagawak who is 
charged with 'inciting' others to disobey a government order 
or break the law under Article 160 of the Criminal Code. 
On 10 March, the 17 men were found guilty and given 
sentences of between one year and nine months and three 
and a half years. 
Flag raising in West Papua, sometimes allowed, sometimes 
regarded as a subversive act. 
It goes without saying that the police authorities who 
ordered and/or took part in the operation to lower the West 
Papuan flag in violation of an agreement that had been 
reached three days earlier with the Papuan Presidum 
Council (see separate article) and caused the deaths of thir-
teen West Papuans are not facing any charges. Nor are the 
members of Brimob who violently attacked defenceless 
prisoners in their cells (see separate article), while they 
were awaiting trial. 
International observers denied entry 
A request by the Australian branch of the International 
Commission of Jurists to send an observer team to attend 
the trials in Wamena was turned down by the Indonesian 
authorities. The mission was to have been headed by Justice 
Elizabeth Evatt. The ICJ's Australian branch has frequently 
sent observer missions to attend political trials in Indonesia 
but this is the first time ever that an observer mission has 
been rejected. 
Amnesty condemns the trials 
Amnesty International has strongly condemned the use of 
the 'hate-sowing' articles in Aceh and West Papua. In a 
statement issued on 7 February 2001 in which it announced 
that the five Papua Presidium Council members in Wamena 
and Muhammad Nazar in Aceh had been granted recogni-
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tion as prisoners of conscience, the organisation said: 
'In Aceh and Papua, it is becoming increasingly difficult 
to distinguish between the current government and that of 
President Suharto. Agents of the state are resorting to the 
same tactics of intimidating, imprisoning, torturing and 
killing those suspected of opposing Jakarta's rule.' 
Five Presidium leaders await trial 
The crackdown on the pro-independence movement in 
West Papua took yet another tum with the arrest of five 
senior members of the Papuan Presidium Council. Four of 
the leaders, Theys Eluay (Presidium chairman), Taha Al 
Hamid (Presidium secretary-general), John Mambor and 
Don Flassy were taken into police custody the day before 1 
December 2001, the day on which the Presidium planned to 
hold events to mark the anniversary of the day in 1961 when 
the Dutch colonial authorities agreed to recognise the West 
Papuan flag and anthem and said they would make prepara-
tions for West Papuan independence. Four days later a fifth 
Presidium Council leader, the Rev. Herman Awom, was also 
taken into custody. All five men still remain in custody but, 
as far as is known, no formal charges have been laid 
although it is believed that they will be charged under 
Article 106 for 'rebellion' or 'separatism'. In December, they 
were transferred from police custody to Abepura prison 
Peaceful demo is now 'treasonable' 
Meanwhile in Jakarta, hundreds of West Papuan students 
held a demonstration on 1 December in support of calls for 
independence. The demonstration was organised by the 
National Front of West Papuan Student (in Exile), and 
students came from universities throughout Java. They 
made their way to the Dutch and US embassies and to the 
UNDP office in Jakarta to present petitions about their 
demands. They expressed full support for the Second 
Papuan Congress in Jayapura last June and called for the 
withdrawal of extra troops which were sent to West Papua 
in the months leading up to 1 December. 
Towards midday they were assaulted by Brimob forces 
who laid into them with batons, tear gas and firearms. The 
students were forced to scatter when tear gas was fired. Two 
demonstrators were hit by rubber bullets fired by the police, 
one in the head, the other in the shoulder. Seven of the 
demonstrators were taken into custody. Three were released 
on the following day after being forced to reverse their 
support for the demands contained in the petitions. 
The other four who refused to make any concessions 
about their views, went on trial in Jakarta on 15 March after 
having been subjected to constant racist abuse and humilia-
tion by their captors, combined with a failure to treat seri-
ous medical conditions. The 
four students are: Laun 
Wenda, Yosep Wenda, Hans 
Go bay, and Mathius 
Rumbrapuk. They have all 
been adopted by Amnesty 
International as prisoners of 
conscience. After being held 
in police custody for two 
months, they were trans-
ferred to Salemba Prison, 
Jakarta on 31 January. 
Mathius Rumbrapuk is 
suffering from a serious 
injury to his right leg as the 
result of being trampled on 
by one of the police officers 
during the demonstration. 
Yosep Wenda suffered a 
blow in the head from the 
police which has impaired 
. . . the hearing in his right ear. In 
Peaceful demonstration of Papuans m the main street of Jakarta late F b R b k 
Following their arrest, Gus Dur, as President Wahid is 
popularly known, several times called for their release but 
he was ignored. The deep disagreement between the presi-
dent and his senior officers was aired very publicly with Gus 
Dur even lamenting the fact that top ministers and the 
national police chief had held a meeting and turned down his 
call for the men's release. [Jakarta Post, 9 December 2000] 
This is not the first time these men have been arrested to 
'await trial' but the cases against them fizzled out and no 
charges were laid. Sources close to the Presidium Council told 
TAPOL last year that this was because Gus Dur had ordered 
their release. It is a sign of the weakening position of Gus Dur 
and the major switch in Jakarta's policy towards West Papua 
that such orders from the president no longer hold sway. 
e ruary, u rapu was 
taken to St Carolus Hospital 
for a check-up where doctors diagnosed him as suffering 
from severe depression, needing psychiatric treatment in 
addition to treatment for his leg wound. 
The charges they are facing are very grave: 'rebellion' and 
'separatism' under article 106 of the Criminal Code for 
which the maximum penalty is life, and charges under the 
'hate-sowing' articles. Why should people who took part in 
a peaceful demonstration be treated with such severity? For 
the answer, we should recall how effective East Timorese 
students studying in Indonesia were in alerting the diplo-
matic community in Jakarta and the wider international 
community about the situation in their country. West 
Papuan students in Indonesia are now being warned against 
indulging in such activities on behalf of their people. * 
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West Papuan refugees at risk in PNG 
The crackdown in West Papua since October last year has resulted in new pressures on Papua New 
Guinea to tighten security along the 800-km border with Indonesia. Hundreds of West Papuans 
who have fled across the border since the Wamena Tragedy are in danger of forced repatriation 
while an OPM leader has gone on trial in PNG for 'illegal entry' 
The increased presence of Indonesian troops and Brimob 
(police crack forces) units in the district of Jayawijaya since 
the Wamena Tragedy in early October (see separate item) 
resulted in hundreds of West Papuans from the Central 
Highlands fleeing their homes and crossing the border into 
Papua New Guinea. Their position has now become precar-
ious with efforts underway by the Indonesian authorities to 
pressure the government of Papua New Guinea not to 
recognise them as refugees and to collude in an operation to 
force the West Papuans back to Indonesia. 
Catholic bishops issue warning 
In an unprecedented move, the four Catholic bishops in 
West Papua, the bishops of Merauke, Agats, Sorong and 
Jayapura, wrote to the governor of Irian Jaya, as West 
Papua is known by the Indonesian authorities, warning 
against any move to force the refugees to return home 
unless certain conditions are met. At present, the people 
who fled have not been classified as 'refugees' which 
means that they do not qualify for assistance either from 
the PNG government or from the UN High Commission 
for Refugees. This has led to a major humanitarian prob-
lem which the bishops said the church alone could not 
handle. 
The bishops pointed out that the number of people who 
fled before and after 1December2000 to Vanimo, the PNG 
town close to the border on the north coast, had risen from 
around 180 last November to five hundred today. More had 
fled across the border in the south, to Daru-Kiunga. 
The bishops said that while it was true that the West 
Papuans wanted to return home, they should not be forced 
to do so as long as their fear and mistrust ab?ut conditioi:is 
in their homeland continue to prevail. Theu fear was m 
part because, the bishops said, a 'number of thei~ peo~le 
had "disappeared" and their fate was n~t known. Wh~le 
the PNG and the UNHCR were now saymg that repatna-
tion is the only solution, the bishops insisted on three 
conditions being met before people went home: no 
compulsion should be used, they should not be sent home 
until the situation back home 'has returned to normal', and 
the repatriation should be monitored by an international 
agency. 
The bishops drew attention to the 'disproportionate' P!es-
ence of security forces in the area. There was also wide-
spread confusion among West Papuans over how the secu-
rity forces treated different OPM units; some were handled 
harshly while others were 'molly-coddled'. 
Recent actions towards OPM units do indeed reveal that the 
bishops' comment in accurate, as the following reports show. 
OPM kidnap unit handled with kid gloves 
In January, an OPM unit operating near the PNG border 
led by commander Willy Onde kidnapped more than a 
dozen workers at a South Korean owned timber works. 
From the start, this action was seen by some observers as a 
put-up job as Willy Onde is known to operate with the 
approval of the local military. The kidnap lasted seve~al 
weeks and after what were described as prolonged negotia-
tions, the hostages were all released. One of Onde's demands 
was to meet the Indonesian president, and lo and behold, at 
the end of this saga, Onde was taken to Jakarta to meet the 
president. There have indeed been reports for some time that 
Indonesian military intelligence have infiltrated some OPM 
units which are more or less functioning under their control. 
By contrast, an OPM leader who has operated from a base 
across the border in PNG for several years, apparently with 
the knowledge of the PNG authorities, was suddenly arrested. 
Mathias Wenda was taken into custody along with twelve of 
his men in late January in a surprise raid on his base in Sepik, 
PNG. Eleven of the men have been tried for 'unlawful pres-
ence' in PNG and sentenced to six months' hard labour by a 
court in Vanimo, while Mathias Wenda and his deputy, James 
Kogoiya, are to face more serious charges at a national court. 
Human rights activists in PNG suspect that the arrest has 
come about as a result of Indonesian pressure and they have 
mounted a campaign to oppose any move by the PNG 
government to deport Wenda to Indonesia. Powes Parkop 
who chairs Melanesian Solidarity based in Port Moresby, 
told Radio Australia. 'It is a well-known fact in PNG that 
Wenda has been operating in West Sepik. For. ... I think the 
last 15 to 20 years, he has been living in West Sepik around 
Bewani area, and also around Vanimo area, operating out of 
PNG. And government officials have spoken to him in the 
past. [The) military have also spoken to him in the past, and 
they know that he has been operating in PNG. [Radio 
Australia, 7 February] 
OPM regroups 
Following the arrest of Mathias Wenda, OPM representa-
tive abroad, John Ondawame, announced that the command 
ofOPM forces right along the 800-km border with PNG was 
now in the hands of 71 -year old OPM leader, Bernard 
Mawen who has for years been commander of the southern 
sector. Ondawame said that with the arrest of Wenda and the 
killing last year in PNG of the other northern sector OPM 
leader, Hans Bomay, the northern border command of the 
OPM was no longer operational. He also spoke disparag-
ingly of other people who claim to be OPM leaders, like 
Willy Onde. [Sydney Morning Herald, 31 January] * 
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Wamena tragedy a provocation 
The Wamena tragedy of 6 October 2000 which led to the deaths of 3 7 people, with scores 
injured and eighty people taken into custody had a profound impact on life in the Baliem 
Valley and West Papua, bringing about fundamental changes of lasting significance, accor-
ding to an investigation. Actions by the security forces triggered a cycle of violence and the 
emergence of inter-group conflict. Thousands fled the area, paralysing the economy and 
inflicting lasting damage on education. 
These are the conclusions drawn by an investigation team 
composed of the main human rights NGOs in Jayapura, 
Kontras-Papua (Commission for the Disappeared and 
Victims of Violence), ELSHAM-Papua (the Institute for 
Human Rights Study and Advocacy), the Jayapura Legal 
Aid Institute, and the Justice and Peace Commission of the 
Jayapura Diocese. 
The tragedy began with a series of operations by army and 
police forces, forcibly pulling down the Papuan flag at a 
number of command posts being manned by Satgas-Papua 
(Papuan special unit) members. In each case, the flag-poles 
were cut down with mechanical saws, the flags torn up and 
the command posts torched or destroyed. 
Flag-lowering agreement breached 
On 3 October, three days before the operation, a meeting 
was held in Jayapura between the Papuan Presidium 
Council on the one hand and the acting governor, the mili-
tary commander, the chief of police and the rector of 
Cendrawasih University, at which agreement was reached 
for Papuan flags to be lowered in orderly fashion by 19 
October after the Presidium Council had been able to 
discuss the flag-raising issue with President Abdurrahman 
Wahid and a senior member of his cabinet. The decision by 
the security forces to launch the Wamena operation was in 
flagrant breach of this agreement and sent shock-waves 
through the Baliem Valley where local communities fully 
believed the flag-raising was in keeping with guidelines 
agreed by the authorities in Jayapura. 
A couple of weeks before the onslaught, feelings had been 
running high in Wamena after low-flying aircraft buzzed the 
town, calling in people's minds the aerial operations over 
the Baliem Valley in 1977. The aircraft used on that occa-
sion were British-made Hawks which had been stationed in 
Biak. In response to pressure from TAPOL, the Hawk 
aircraft were withdrawn in early October. [See TAPOL 
Bulletin No 160, November-December 2000.] 
The forcible removal of Papuan flags occurred in a series 
of actions in the town of Wamena, capital of Jayawijaya 
district. Well-armed teams of Brimob (police commandos) 
and Kostrad (army strategic command) troops, moved from 
command post to command post. Papuans at the posts 
offered no resistance and in most cases fled. On each occa-
sion, a number of people were rounded up, beaten with 
great brutality, forced into police vans and placed in police 
custody. Altogether two Papuans were shot dead during the 
flag-lowering incidents and eleven Papuans were shot dead 
during later operations that day. 
News of the operations spread like wildfire through the 
town and beyond, bringing large crowds into the area from 
surrounding villages. Attempts were made to block the 
movement of the troops by placing obstacles in the roads. 
However, community elders and local members of the 
Presidium Council intervened to calm rising passions, and 
tried to persuade the crowds to desist from engaging in 
armed resistance. 
After the flag-poles and command posts had been 
destroyed, the troops carried out 'sweepings' in parts of the 
town. In one incident, they forced their way into a hostel for 
school-pupils and ordered the youngsters out with their 
teacher. They were kicked and beaten and shots were fired. 
Twenty-seven pupils and the teacher were taken to a nearby 
police post; on the way they were forced to crawl on their 
knees while being hit with rifle butts. 
Setting Papuans against non-Papuans 
In the afternoon, troops fanned out to a nearby village, 
Wouma, where they were confronted by an angry crowd, 
some of whom responded by shooting arrows at the 
soldiers. The troops opened fire in the air and at the ground, 
then withdrew in the direction of the town, followed by the 
Papuans in hot pursuit. At a market-place, shots were fired 
at the crowd from inside one of the houses. Seeing that the 
troops were now using the houses of non-Papuans from 
which to attack, the crowd attacked the homes, triggering a 
murderous attack on the non-Papuan inhabitants and the 
destruction of many homes. 
For the first time in the history of the Papuan struggle, 
several dozen non-Papuan inhabitants were killed, injecting 
a new and ugly element into the situation - inter-ethnic 
strife. This appears to have been a deliberate move to fan 
the flame of inter-communal conflict, in order to undermine 
and discredit the Papuan struggle. Altogether twenty-four 
non-Papuans were killed, including several children. In the 
next few days, thousands of non-Papuans fled the area, 
believing that their lives were now in danger. Until that 
time, the two communities had lived peacefully, side by 
side. 
During the course of the operations, around eighty 
Papuans were arrested, including the group of school-chil-
dren; they were all treated with great brutality. On the 
following day, all but sixteen of the detainees were released. 
The sixteen were joined by another man, Josep Udin, who 
was already severely battered. He was rushed to hospital 
where he later died. 
More sweepings took place on the next day when troops 
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broke their way into many people's home. 
Three weeks after the Wamena tragedy, on 30 October, 
the Minister-Coordinator for Political, Social and Security 
Affairs, General (ret'd) Bambang Susilo Yudhoyono, visited 
the troops in Wamena and praised them for their handling of 
the unrest which, he said, was 'extremely well done, appro-
priate and relatively speedy'. [See BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 1 November 2000-
Presidium scapegoated 
Two days later, senior military, police and civilian offi-
cials held talks with the Jayawijaya representatives (Panel) 
of the Papuan Presidium Council. At first the talks, 
appeared to be aimed at calming things down and agreeing 
on guidelines for lowering Papuan flags in other parts of the 
district. But suddenly, after agreement had been reached, 
five Panel members including the Rev. Obeth Komba, were 
'invited' to the police command. When the police started to 
interrogate them, they protested vigorously. The interroga-
tions went on into the night and for most of the following 
two days. In the end, they were ordered to identify and hand 
over the men who had taken part in the attack on non-
Papuan homes near Wouma. Failure to do so would result in 
their being held responsible for the tragedy and facing 
charges of rebellion. Not surprisingly, local people later 
refused to identify anyone when approached by the Panel 
members. Placing the Panel members in such an invidious 
position had the effect of discrediting the PPC whose legit-
imacy had been so well established after its successful 
congress in May-June 2000. 
When the Panel members, escorted by local officials, later 
travelled to other parts of the district to try to persuade local 
people to lower the Papuan flag, they were greeted with 
howls of abuse. 
Just prior to the Wamena tragedy, chief of police S.Y. 
Wenas told the press about the agreement reached with the 
Papuan Presidium Council, to lower the flags after a meet-
ing between the PPC and the president, by 19 October. 
[Cendrawasih Pos, 6 October] Yet on the very day this 
appeared in print, the police, acting on his orders, took 
action in Wamena in breach of this agreement. 
Three days later, Wenas told the local press: 'The Papuan 
Presidium Council, in particular the Wamena Panel, must be 
held responsible for the bloody Wamena incident. There 
were dozens of victims including a pregnant woman, people 
were tortured and property was torched.' [Cendrawasih Pos, 
9 October 2000] 
Casualties 
Altogether thirty-seven people were killed during the 
Wamena Tragedy, and 89 were seriously injured. 13,565 
non-Papuans left Wamena for elsewhere in the Baliem 
Valley. The 37 deaths included two Papuans shot dead when 
their flags were forcibly lowered, eleven Papuans shot dead 
during subsequent operations on 6 October, and 24 non-
Papuans killed on the following day. 
Twenty-two people remain in custody and have since been 
formally indicted. They include sixteen Satgas-Papua 
members, five PPC/Panel members and one governrnent 
employee. 
Another casualty has been severe disruption in the educa-
tion system in Jayawijaya. Many teachers, the majority of 
whom are non-Papuans, have fled the area, with no inten-
-- -- - -----
tion of returning. In the three months since the tragedy, 
nothing has been done to repair the damage to the system, 
to help teachers and pupils who were traumatised. Although 
many people were wounded, almost all the medical person-
nel fled the area. 
The investigation team said that the tragedy had created 
deep divisions within society: Baliem Valley people against 
non-Baliem Valley people, Papuans against non-Papuans, 
coastal Papuans against highland Papuans. 
The truth turned on its head 
'In essence, the Wamena incident consisted of violence by 
the security forces against the community,' the team 
concluded. 'There is no evidence that the violence was trig-
gered by ethnic differences, differences of skin colour or 
differences of religion. All sections of the community were 
victimised by the incident. Nevertheless, these facts were 
gradually blotted out because the events were never prop-
erly investigated. Gradually, a different perception emerged 
as a result of the way things were reported in the press and 
the biased statements by the police, pitting one group 
against the other. Out of all this emerged the perception that 
in essence, the Wamena incident was an act of violence by 
Papuans against non-Papuans.' 
Stigmatising the Papuans for the Wamena incident became 
the order of the day, not only by the local police chief but 
also by senior members of the government in Jakarta. These 
distortions triggered a attack a few days later on a hostel in 
Yogyakarta, Central Java. It was also used by the police in 
Jayapura as the pretext to launch an attack on students' 
hostels in Abepura in the wake of an attack on a police 
command post there on 7 December. 
Moreover, following the Wamena tragedy, there was a 
substantial increase in the number of troops throughout the 
district of Jayawijaya. According to an announcement by 
district chief, Drs David Hubi, there are now between ten 
and twenty TNI and Brimob troops stationed in every sub-
district. Furthermore, now that non-Papuan teachers have 
fled the area, soldiers are taking over as teachers in the 
schools. (This is reminiscent of what happened for many 
years in East Tim or.) 
Notorious Timor veteran takes command 
At the end of January, the TNI central command 
announced the appointment of Major-General Mahidin 
Simbolon as the commander of the Trikora military 
command in Jayapura. His appointment followed the death 
in an air crash of the previous commander. 
Simbolon, a member of Kopassus, the army's elite 
commandos, has had no fewer than six tours of duty in East 
Timor, starting with Operasi Seroja, the invasion of the 
territory in December 1975. Like all Kopassus officers serv-
ing in East Timor, Simbolon played an active role in SOI, 
the special Kopassus unit designed for counter-insurgency, 
whose local command posts were used to torture captured 
East Timorese. He graduated from the military academy in 
1974. He and many of his class-mates have distinguished 
themselves as 'East Timor veterans' who whose military 
careers have been advanced by their many operational 
duties in East Timor. 
He led the unit which arrested resistance leader, Xanana 
Gusmao, in 1992, for which he was given a special promo-
tion from major to colonel. From 1995 to 1997, he was 
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commander of the Wira Dharma Korem in charge of East 
Tim or. Then, until 1999, he was chief of staff at the 
Udayana military command based in Bali, the command in 
overall control of East Timar. The Udayana commander at 
that time was the notorious Major-General Adam Damiri. It 
was during the tenure of these two generals in Bali that 
Operasi Sapu Jagad, was launched, the operation whose 
main purpose was to create, recruit and finance the many 
militia units that spearheaded the army's violence before, 
during and after the UN-supervised ballot. This operation 
must be held responsible for the widespread destruction and 
killings that climaxed in September, after the ballot result 
was announced on 4 September. One of the militia units, 
Mahidi, an acronym, meaning 'dead or alive with integra-
tion', was actually named after him. 
His appointment to take command in West Papua can be 
expected to result in an intensification of the use of intelli-
gence operations which he practised during his many years 
of service in East Timar. Militia gangs. Satgas Merah-Putih 
(red-and-white militias) are already known to be active in 
the territory. The new commander is likely to further refine 
this strategy. 
Students killed and brutalised 
Two months after the Wamena tragedy, police in Jayapura 
raided several students' and school-pupils hostels in the city, 
in retaliation for an attack by unidentified assailants on a 
police station during which two police officers and a secu-
rity guard were killed. Although there was no evidence to 
suggest that students had anything to do with the attack, the 
police directed their retaliatory raids on several hostels 
where students and pupils from the central highlands are 
accommodated, apparently intending to draw a connection 
between these students and the people blamed for the 
attacks on non-Papuans during the Wamena incident. While 
the raids were underway, police officers yelled abusive 
remarks at 'Wamena inhabitants who killed our men'. 
[Report by ELS-HAM, 14 December 2000] 
The totally unprovoked attack on the students took place 
early on 7 December. The first victim was Elkius Suhuniab, 
18, who was shot and fatally wounded during the raid. He 
died the next day in hospital. 
During the raid, more than one hundred students and 
pupils were taken into police custody where they were 
subjected to extreme acts of brutality, during the course of 
which two more students were killed: Johnny Karunggu, 
18, and Orry Doronggi, 17. 
Eyewitness account 
It so happens that shortly before the police raid, a visiting 
Swiss journalist, Oswald lten, was arrested by the police for 
taking 'political photographs' and was held in police custody 
for eleven days until he was deported following intervention 
on his behalf by the Swiss embassy in Jakarta. He wrote later 
about the 'unspeakably shocking' things he saw from his cell. 
He describes how he heard detainees being brought in 
early in the morning of 7 December and was able to peer 
through the bars of the cell-block door leading to the guard-
room where they were being held. 
About half a dozen policemen were swinging their clubs 
at bodies that were lying on the floor and, oddly enough, did 
not cry out; at most, only soft groans issued from 
them.(When a policeman saw me, I went back to my usual 
place) from where I could still se~ the clubs, staffs and split 
bamboo whips at their work. Their ends were smeared w1.th 
blood and blood sprayed the walls all the way up.to the ceil-
ing. Sometimes I saw the policemen hoppm~ up . on 
benches, continuing to strike blows from there or JUmpmg 
back down on the bodies below. 
Later that day, the Swiss journalist witnessed the death of 
Orry Doronggi in his cell: 
The last one to enter (my cell) was a large man, who fell 
over the bodies on the floor and lay there groaning. He tried 
repeatedly to straighten himself up, only to fall back down 
again. Now and again the faces of guards appeared at the 
barred window, looking down impassively at the tangle of 
maltreated bodies. In the back of the big man's head, there 
appeared to be a coin-sized hole through which I believed 
to spot some brain tissue. After nearly an hour and a half of 
groaning and spasmodic movement, his suffering body 
neared its end. About two metres from me, his powerful 
body raised itself again and his head struck the wall. A final 
laboured breath issued from him, then his head dropped 
down onto the cement floor. At last his agony was over. 
After a while, three lackeys came and dragged the body out. 
Later I learned that the man who had been tortured to death 
was named Ori Doronggi. I saw a picture of his corpse in 
the newspaper, Cendrawasih Pos. The dispatch said three 
dead Papuans had been brought to the morgue and the 
police stated they had 'died in the fighting.' [Sydney 
Morning Herald, 9 January 2001.] 
As far as is known, all the other students and pupils 
arrested at the time were later released. However, the direc-
tor of ELS-HAM, the Institute for Human Rights Study and 
Advocacy, Yohanis G. Bonay, was taken into police custody 
for 24 hours, questioned under Article 311 of the Criminal 
Code and accused of 'discrediting public officials' for publi-
cising the deaths of the students at the hands of the police. 
An official of the local legal aid institute and a journalist 
who had printed information about the police behaviour 
were also questioned. 
Killings in Merauke and Tiom 
Security forces opened fire on flag-raisers in two other 
places. Both these atrocities occurred when West Papuans 
were hoping that they could mark the anniversary of 1 
December 1961 by peacefully raising the flag. There was 
tension everywhere but some relief when 1 December 
proceeded in Jayapura without incident. But what happened 
in Merauke and Tiom shows that the troops were on orders 
to shoot at groups raising the flag. 
In Merauke, in the south-east, about 500 people gathered 
together to raise the flag on 2 December, in spite of a 
government ban on flag-raising. When security forces 
arrived on the scene to force down the flag, a scuffie broke 
out and the troops opened fire, killing six people, all of 
whom were reportedly shot in the head. 
The other atrocity occurred in Tiom, a small town in the 
Central Highlands. The incident occurred on 17 December 
when the police claimed that local tribesmen attacked a 
group of soldiers who were trying to tear down a flag. 
According to the police, one soldier was killed. But John 
Rumbiak of ELS-HAM, the Institute for Human Rights 
Study and Advocacy: 'Sources at the Baptist Church in 
Tiom told us the locals were singing, dancing and going 
wild over the flag they'd just raised when the soldiers 
continued on page 7 
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Give peace a chance in Maluku 
A gradual shift to peace is becoming apparent in M aluku. Local representatives from the disputing 
communities agreed in March to meet and find a solution. The first meeting was due to take place in 
the Kei islands in Southeast Maluku. Early signs of war-weariness intensified in December when the 
warring parties in Ambon anticipated another outburst of violence during Christmas and ldul Fitri, 
coming within two days of each other. Instead, the religious holidays passed off relatively peacefully. 
This important initiative is called Tim Baku Bae Maluku 
(the Maluk:u Good Efforts Team) and it was in their third 
meeting in Yogya earlier this year that they agreed to their 
present format. TBBM includes a wide range of people, 
local traditional leaders, local warlords, religious leaders 
from the Christian and Muslim side and several facilitators. 
On 7 March a TBBM delegation presented their demands 
to the MPR, the People's Consultative Assembly, and Vice-
President Megawati. They formulated a series of demands 
which provided the analytical framework of TBBM: 
# To press the government to reconsider the model and 
orientation of development applied so far. Until now, this 
has provoked social conflicts and threatened disintegration. 
Another model should be embraced which focuses much 
more on local interests and gives people better access to 
economic, political and cultural resources in Maluk:u. 
# To reconsider the position of TNI/POLRI (Armed 
Forces/Police) within the state system. The role of 
TNI/POLRI has been far too costly and should not be 
continued. The team expressed the hope that a democratic 
civilian government would control the security forces and 
end the civil emergency. 
# To call on the government to end the violence once and 
for all and act as the initiator of a process of reconciliation 
and to call on the government to handle the post-conflict 
situation wisely by introducing reintegration programmes, 
taking care of the refugees, and restoring the economy, poli-
tics and law in Maluk:u. 
In August last year, the first steps towards reconciliation 
were taken by Muslim and Christian leaders, in a series of 
low-key discussions. The meetings took place outside 
Maluk:u, to pave the way for a more substantial series of 
reconciliation meetings in Maluk:u itself. 
Reconciliation meeting on Kei islands 
On 9 March, after four days of intensive dialogue, another 
important agreement was reached in the efforts to find a 
solution to the ongoing conflict. One thousand five hundred 
people from a variety of organisations and social groups in 
many parts ofMaluk:u came together the following week for 
an initial meeting. Participants from both sides of the 
conflict expressed their conviction that dialogue was the 
only way to end the dispute. 
Maluk:u watchers are these days more optimistic. In an 
assessment of conditions in North Maluk:u, Central Maluk:u 
and Southeast Maluk:u, North Malukan sociologist Thamrin 
Amal Tomagola, came to the conclusion that the only 
remaining tinderbox was Central Maluk:u which is where 
peace efforts have failed to get off the ground. Press and 
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against the sociologist and the Ambon newspaper Siwa 
Lima for publishing his comments. Other military officers 
frequently accused of being behind the violence are Lt. 
General Djadja Suparman (former chief of Kostrad, the 
army's strategic command) and Major-General Suaidy 
Marassabessy (former commander of the Maluk:u military 
command). 
Security situation improves 
According to Tomagola, about 80 per cent of North 
Maluk:u has returned to normal. Both the 'whites' (the 
Muslims) and the 'reds' (the Christians) have agreed to a 
truce and the laying down of arms. In the remainder of the 
territory, people still cling to their weapons, fearing that 
violence may erupt again. 
In South-east Maluk:u the situation has vastly improved; 
the region has now entered the stage of social reconstruc-
tion. Religious and traditional leaders are determined to 
heal the wounds of past conflicts and gradually restore the 
traditional values to their society. In particular, informal 
leaders and the local Catholic Church have shown great 
courage in their efforts to restore peace. Individuals from 
outside harbouring malicious intentions have been expelled 
and any suspicious visitors have been told to leave. Most of 
the provocation originates from these external elements, 
including armed groups who claim that they can create 
'stability' through violence. 
The newly-appointed governor of the recently-created 
North Maluk:u province, has played a positive role in the 
process of reconciliation. Both sides recognise him as non-
partisan and having good intentions. The number of 
outsiders is relatively small as compared with Central 
Maluk:u and there are far fewer Laskar Jihad trouble-
TAPOL Bulletin No. 161, March/April 2001 21 
MALUKU 
makers, not more than 200 people. In contrast with the 
armed Laskar Jihad gangs in Central Maluku, these people 
confine themselves to social activities and proselytising 
non-Muslims rather than getting involved in warlike 
pursuits. 
Many lines of command in Maluku 
The government's decision last June to declare a state of 
civil emergency has done nothing to improve security in 
Maluku. On the contrary, it created a situation where the 
military have the power and authority to take action. While 
the military commander, Brig. General I Made Yasa, has 
special emergency powers, the presence of many non-
organic troops (reinforcements from elsewhere in 
Indonesia) has further exacerbated the violence. Altogether 
14 battalions were sent to Maluku, some of them fresh from 
East Timar, having left there in 1999, before the arrival of 
the UN troops. 
Approximately half a million people were forced to leave 
their homes and villages. 
A new force known as Yon Gab (Batalyon Gabungan or 
Combined Battalion) was recently despatched to Maluku by 
TNI headquarters in Cilangkap for 'special duties'; it 
combines elite troops from the army, navy and airforce, and 
falls under the direct command of TNI headquarters. Now 
that the police force has been separated from the armed 
forces, they have their own line of command but the duties 
performed by the police under the civil emergency are not 
clear, nor is the division between the army/TNI and Polri 
(the police force). Formally speaking, under the civil emer-
gency, the highest authority is the governor of Maluku, but 
in fact, Governor Saleh Latuconsina who is a civilian and is 
seen as a moderate, is virtually powerless, with security 
handled by military commander Brig. General I Made Yasa. 
But to further complicate things, Yon Gab, is not under his 
command but under the command of Cilangkap. 
Recent developments 
Everybody recognises, including the military top in 
Jakarta, that the situation in Maluku got out of control. TNI 
senior officers have themselves admitted that elements 
within the security forces have intensified the violence and 
blame 'rogue elements' within the ranks of the security 
forces. Maluku watchers agree with this analysis but go 
much further, rightly concluding that the violence was 
deliberately provoked by military allies and cronies of the 
old Suharto regime. The worsening security and t~~ de~p 
animosity between the two religious commumt1es ~n 
Maluku are used as proof that civilian rule in Indonesia 
won't work. 
However not all sections of the TNI have contributed to 
fanning th; conflict. Mainstream sections, including offi-
cers who back President Wahid, fear that prolonged 
violence in Maluku could threaten the country with disinte-
gration and have tried to bring it to a halt. 
Drastic measures 
Recent events have compelled the TNI leadership to 
reconsider their strategy in Maluku. This led to the decision 
to withdraw a number of non-organic battalions. The 
number of military and police battalions was suddenly dras-
tically reduced from 17 to 4 by the end of February. The 
battalions withdrawn included two from Central Java, two 
from East Java, one from South Sumatra, one from 
Kalimantan and two Brirnob battalions. Two joint security 
battalions consisting of police and military were also 
expected to be withdrawn in February. 
The withdrawal of these battalions is an admission on the 
part of the armed forces leadership that the strategy of 
flooding Maluku with territorial soldiers from all over 
Indonesia has failed. It is probably also recognition of the 
fact that the security situation in parts of Maluku has 
improved. Ironically, there were always fewer troops in 
North and Southeast Maluku, both regions which have 
remained relatively peaceful, far fewer than the number of 
troops concentrated in Central Maluku where security has 
continued to be very precarious. 
It is widely recognised that Indonesian territorial troops 
are poorly trained, undisciplined and lack the basic skills 
needed for peace-keeping in the war situation prevailing in 
the islands of Ambon, Saparua and other islands in Central 
Maluku. Far from resolving the problem, army and police 
battalions have only exacerbated security problems. While 
the two warring parties, equipped with standard TNI 
weapons, were continuing their armed feud, TNI and Polri 
officers and soldiers have themselves become involved in 
one of the two sides. The TNI leadership have been forced 
to admit that soldiers have gone absent without leave to 
throw their lot in with Christian or Muslim militia. While 
they avoid mentioning figures, Tomagola says that 280 
security officers have deserted. 
New offensive from Jakarta? 
On 21 January, members of Yon Gab TNI launched a 
surprise attack on one of the headquarters of the Muslim 
militia. Already for several days a marine post in Mardika, 
a neighbourhood in Ambon City had been fired on from 
several directions. Having concluded that the attacks had 
come from a hotel in the Muslim area, a platoon of the Yon 
Gab decided to go onto the attack. Five police and military 
officers were caught red-handed and store of TNI standard 
weapons was captured, plus a small quantity of shabu-
shabu, a popular amphetamine drug, widely used in 
Indonesia. The following day another nine police officers 
were arrested. 
The arrests on 22 and 23 January constituted the first 
concrete action in the two-year conflict against mutinous 
TNI and Polri personnel. Among the 14 arrested, five held 
senior positions. On 10 March Governor Saleh Latuconsina 
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revealed that ~he authorities have identified groups of 
defian~ secunty. officers responsible for provoking 
chaos m the reg10n. He said that they were the leaders 
who conducted rogue shootings and caused random 
bomb blasts. The governor also said that the deserted 
officer~ have been trying to infiltrate the crowds by 
provokti:tg people in restive areas and along the borders 
of Mushm and Christian neighbourhoods such as Batu 
Merah in Mardika and Air Kuning in Ahuru. 
Entrenchment and development 
Two years of fighting have created a situation in 
Central Maluku which foreign journalists describe as a 
cycle of violence with no end in sight. Terrible things 
have been done by both sides, in the name of religion. 
Mosques in Christian ar~as have been reduced to heaps 
of rubble; one mosque ts now used as a billiard hall 
while in Muslim-held areas, churches have been 
destroyed. 
T~e main Chri~tian militia group is led by Agus 
Watttmena who claims to have a vigilante force of 20 000 
people in Ambon City and vicinity. The core of the ~rmed 
Muslim unit. Laskar Jihad which consists of 2,000 people 
have come from Java, but they have gained numerical 
equality with the Christians thanks to the recruitment of 
hug~ numbers of fanatics. Both sides are equally fanatical, 
vowmg to avenge all attacks from the other side. Anyone 
who dares to promote peace and reconciliation between 
these militia is seen as a traitor. 
Should the level of violence continue to worsen the situ-
ation would be comparable to Somalia or Congo. 'warlords 
fro'? ~oth sides have become increasingly powerful; it is in 
thetr mterest to keep the conflict going because this 
provides them with a power base and a reliable source of 
income. There is a constant flow of assistance from outside 
for both sides. Muslims claim that the Christians receive 
plenty of aid from Europe while the Christians blame 
fundamentalist Muslim groups for aiding the Muslims. 
In such circumstances, the subsistence economy has stag-
nated. Peasants cannot tend their fields or have become 
refugees. Small traders cannot buy and sell goods. 
Terror on the island of Kesui 
The level of terror on the island of Kesui in East Seram 
in l~te November reached such a scale that many 
outsiders refused at first to believe that such things could 
happen. The Muslim and Christian inhabitants of Kesui 
have lived in harmony with each other for generations. 
But this harmony was shattered when a group of 
Muslims arrived, dressed in white robes and armed with 
machetes. They demanded that the Catholics convert to 
Islam. One school teacher who refused to do so was 
beheaded. 
Out of fear for their lives, the entire village of 100 
agreed to convert, but what came next was unimaginable. 
~t the beginning of December, the villagers were herded 
mto several mosques and a bloody ritual started. The 
women, including young girls, were taken into a small 
room; their genitals were washed and their clitorises cut 
with a knife without antiseptics or pain-killers. The men 
were circumcised with a single razor blade, also without 
painkillers and antiseptics. Many of the victims later 
suffered from infections. Although Kesui is small and 
MALUKU 
Ambon-city, a place in rubbles 
isolated, several Kesui villagers managed to escape to 
Ambon and the news finally reached the outside world. 
The camp~ign of forced conversion in Kesui provoked 
anger and dismay among Muslims and Christians alike. 
The Catholic Church organised a special mass to undo 
the forced conversion. One theory holds that the barbaric 
a.ct i~ Kesui was the final straw for the military authori-
ties m Jakarta. Until then, the only policy that was 
pursued was to send another battalion to a restive area. 
But t~e Kesui case angered many people and a special 
battahon was send to the area with orders for a shoot-to-
kill approach. Some of the culprits have been arrested 
and several ring leaders have been identified. 
Violence in decline 
_while ~rovocation and acts of violence by outside forces 
still continue, there has been a decline. Efforts to unleash 
conflict during Christmas and Idul Fitri failed. Instead the 
~ame .ct.ark forces o:g.anised a nationwide campaign of 
mstab1hty by orgamsmg a number of bomb blasts in 
churches right across Indonesia. However, the campaign 
backfired; far from setting Christians against Muslims, the 
act of terror st~~ngthened gr~ssroots solidarity among the 
two .commumt1~s : Immediately after the bombings, 
Mushm and Chnsttan youth organisations rallied together 
and organised mutual security measures for places of 
worship. 
T?ere is ca':1tious optimism b~cause the weapon of provo-
cat10n and violence ts becommg blunt and less effective 
while war-weariness is taking hold in Maluku. The 500 000 
IDPs (internally displaced persons) in Maluku and' the 
surroun?in~ islands are becoming increasingly restless. 
The maJonty want to go back home to restart their lives 
and rebuild their villages, wherever conditions have 
become conducive to such intentions. The reconciliation 
eff~~s by. Tim Baku Bae Maluku and the meeting in Kei are 
positive signs that the end of the bloody conflict in Maluku 
is now in sight. * 
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New solidarity organisation born 
An international conference at George Washington University from 23-25 February in Washington led 
to the establishment of IHRN, the Indonesia Human Rights Network. Thanks to months of thoroug~­
going preparations, the conference was a resounding success. As a new kid on the block, IHRN will 
bolster the growth of international solidarity with Indonesia at a time when this has become sorely 
needed. 
IHRN was fortunate is being able to use the expertise and 
facilities of ETAN, the East Timor Action Network, which 
has been a valued grassroots organisation for the last 
decade. The ETAN Washington office took charge of the 
preparations for the IHRN kick-off conference. Activists 
from a wide variety of NGOs, Indonesia Alert, the US 
Committee for Refugees, Global Exchange, Direct Relief, 
Nonviolence International, the International Labour Rights 
Fund, Peace Brigades International and ETAN were elected 
onto the Executive Board of IHRN. 
For the time being, Lynn Fredriksson who was Washington 
Coordinator of ETAN, is the interim co-ordinator for IHRN. 
Through her tireless efforts, the conference was attended by 
activists from all parts of the US, Indonesianists from many 
universities, key people from human rights organisations, 
lawyers involved in international legal affairs and peace 
activists. Indonesian Chinese living in the US as well as 
Acehnese, West Papuan and people from Maluku also 
participated. The international character of the conference 
was strengthen by the presence of activists from the 
Netherlands, the UK, Germany and Australia and the 
discussions were enriched by the presence of activists from 
Jakarta, Aceh, Maluku, West Papua and East Timor. TAPOL 
was represented by Liem Soei Liong. 
J afar Siddiq Hamzah 
Following an opening message from Carmel Budiardjo of 
TAPOL who was unable to be present herself, the confer-
ence paid tribute to one of its founders, Jafar Siddiq 
Hamzah, who disappeared in August last year while on a 
visit to Medan. One month later his body was found outside 
Medan, together with the bodies of four unidentified 
persons. Jafar was a human rights lawyer from Aceh. He 
founded IF A, the International Forum for Aceh based in 
New York, an NGO working for human rights and democ-
racy in Aceh. He was also actively involved in the founding 
of SCHRA, the Support Committee for Human Rights in 
Aceh which was set up in Bangkok in July 1999. 
The first IHRN conference made a pledge that its advo-
cacy for human rights in Indonesia would honour the legacy 
of Jafar and help to prevent further violence against 
Indonesian and Acehnese people. 
Panel discussions 
Hendardi, the chair of PBHI (the Indonesian Legal Aid 
and Human Rights Association), one of the leading human 
rights and legal aid organisations in Jakarta was the keynote 
speaker. He is a leading columnist in the Indonesian press 
and writes about a range of topics like human rights, corrup-
tion, the military and land and labour issues. He spoke 
about the present complex political situation in Indonesia, 
the many waves of violence and the beleaguered position _of 
the nominally civilian government of Abdurrahman Wahid. 
Support for civilian supremacy and a strong anti-military 
position was the dominant feature of all. the co~ference 
discussions. The topics discussed were w1de-rangmg and 
the discussions were lively, making the conference a memo-
rable occasion. The conference panels focused on topics 
like: The Politics of Indonesia; Human Rights in Aceh, West 
Papua & Maluku; Military Rule: TNI, Police & Paramilitary 
Violence & US Military Assistance; The Economics of 
Indonesia, US Government on Indonesia; East & West 
Timor: Human Rights, Nation-Building & Refugees; 
Systems of Justice: East Timor & International Tribunals. 
There was also a panel on religion in Indonesia. Practical 
workshops were held on: People's Justice: Labour, Women, 
Land, the Environment & Displaced People, Lobbying in 
Washington and a panel on Grassroots Organising & Media 
Work. The conference ended with a session on strategy in 
the coming months and it was decided to focus on strength-
ening civil society in Indonesia and pressing for the reten-
tion of the US arms embargo against Indonesia. 
More than fifty people made contributions as resource 
persons, including people with many years of experience 
working on a variety of issues in Indonesia and/or East Timor. 
They included Sidney Jones, Jeff Ballinger, Sylvia Tiwon, 
Abigail Abrash, Charlie Scheiner, Roger Clark, John Miller, 
T. Kumar, Liem Soei Liong and Jana Mason. Several officials 
working in government agencies contributed to discussions at 
the panel sessions, including Ed Mc Williams who is head of 
the Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Division of the 
State Department.. 
In keeping with NGO tradition in the US, the conference 
was followed by two days of lobbying in the Senate and the 
House of Representatives on Capitol Hill, and meeting 
people at the State Department. For many of those coming 
from outside the US, lobbying in Washington D.C. was a 
new experience which helped broadened their horizons. In 
the meantime, also in the good tradition of conferences held 
by activists, the positive atmosphere resulted in the launch-
ing of many new initiatives. On the second day of the 
conference a small gathering agreed to found a new West 
Papua solidarity group. 
For more information about the activities of IHRN or for 
papers presented at the conference, please contact IHRN, 
1101 Pennsylvania Avenue SE, Washington, D.C. 20003, 
(202) 546-0044, (202) 546-6118 fax, ihm@etan.org, 
www.indonesianetwork.org 
US report on human rights in Indonesia 
Shortly after the conference, the annual human rights 
continued on page 7 
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REGIONAL AUTONOMY 
Regional autonomy, an essential part of 
democratisation 
Even at the best of times, Indonesia, the largest archipelago in the world, is a tough country to govern 
not least because of the many ethnic, cultural and economic differences. In colonial days a highly 
centralised system was imposed by the rulers and during the three decades of Suharto rule, centralism 
was greatly intensified. On 1January2001, two bills on autonomy came into force, granting districts 
and cities very broad autonomy. This process of devolution will affect all aspects of life. TAPOL hopes 
to follow the progress of this important experiment in goverance. 
Implementing regional 
autonomy in Indonesia 
after such a long period of 
a highly centralised 
system means going from 
one extreme to the 
extreme. While there are 
some who strongly 
support the change and 
others who fiercely 
oppose it, the majority of 
people take a position of 
wait and see. The discus-
sion about decentralisa-
tion has been going on for 
years. In the final years of 
the Suharto era, decentral-
isation was part of the 
reform agenda. When 
Suharto was forced to step 
down, autonomy at last 
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Being a non-Javanese and more open to the idea of decen-
tralisation, B.J. Habibie, a Buginese from South Sulawesi, 
who was president for a year after Suharto stepped down, was 
very much in favour of autonomy and it was his government 
that initiated the process of drafting the two autonomy laws. 
The Indonesian nation state is often seen by non-Javanese as 
a Javanese kingdom. During the Suharto era, a favourite 
theme for many political cartoonists in the underground press 
was to portray Suharto as a greedy Javanese sultan. 
The pros and cons 
The proponents of devolution argue that it will guarantee 
implementation of the reform programme. Heavy-handed 
rule from Jakarta must stop and the regions can only 
develop their potential if local people can participate in 
democratic local government through elected local assem-
blies. The matter became even more pressing after the East 
Timorese rejected Jakarta's offer of autonomy in late 1999. 
While proponents of devolution insisted that, unless this 
was implemented quickly, the country would face disinte-
gration and saw it as a way to curb the voices of separatism, 
others argued that autonomy would fuel separatist violence. 
There are also those who fear that autonomy will weaken 
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Regional autonomy, power to the 350 districts ? 
The people who drafted the laws on devolution had 
impeccable credentials with no hidden agendas. At the helm 
was non-Javanese Prof. Ryaas Rasyid, Minister of 
Administrative Reform whose portfolio included regional 
autonomy in Wahid's first cabinet but in August 2000, his 
department was stripped of responsibility for implementa-
tion of the two autonomy bills even though he was busily 
engaged in preparing a hundred or so implementary regula-
tions. Implementation was handed over to the interior 
ministry which is headed by a retired Javanese general, 
Suriadi Sudirdja, and made the responsibility of a direc-
torate-general in his department. Apart from the defence 
ministry, this is the most heavily militarised department. In 
disgust, Ryaas Rasyid resigned and accused the government 
of backtracking on the autonomy issue. His intention had 
been to place devolution under the control of an indepen-
dent regional autonomy board, but this was overruled by 
President Wahid. 
A stillborn child? 
Some people strongly believe that implementing devolution 
in a period of political and economic chaos is like playing 
with fire while others argue that devolution is the only way 
ahead to avoid the country's disintegration. But behind this 
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deep divide, it is a fact that non-Javanese at the centre of 
power are much more in favour of devolution than the 
Javanese power-holders. Both the president and vice-presi-
dent are Javanese and the minister in charge of the 
programme is a retired, authoritarian Javanese general; hence 
the lack of political will at the centre to devolve powers. 
Vice President Megawati has claimed that most regions are 
not yet ready to assume these new powers and responsibili-
ties. This negative attitude found a willing response from 
other members of the Wahid cabinet. Hardly had things got 
started when the government revealed that it was planning to 
repossess some powers from the regions. Interior affairs 
minister Surjadi. announced in mid-February that the govern-
ment would ask parliament to amend Law No 22 without 
even consulting the regions, alleging that insufficient thought 
had been given to prevailing social and political conditions. 
It is certainly to be expected that the process of devolution 
will proceed in some places better than in others .. Some 
regions will need help from the central government for 
some time to come while others, with the backing of grass-
roots NGOs and a vibrant civil society, are determined to 
make devolution a success. 
Most arguments in favour of backtracking have been tech-
nocratic ones. One is that even with a flow of money from the 
centre, some regions will be incapable of running health care, 
agriculture or education. Another criticism alleges that the 
transfer of civil servants from the centre to the regions will 
create huge problems. Both problems are certain to arise in 
the initial period but devolution proponents say that trial and 
error is more than legitimate for such a major experiment. 
Proponents of devolution are aware of the serious flaws in 
the devolution process, in particular the absence of a solid, 
transparent local government machinery and a set of regu-
lations capable of sorting out the division of authority 
between central and local government. Briefing of the 
bupati, the district chiefs who will head the devolved 
administrations, has been pathetic and virtually nothing has 
been done to apprise the general public and civil servants of 
the changes. No fewer than 1.9 million civil servants will 
transfer from the central to the local bureaucracy. By 
August 2000, when the regional autonomy division became 
part of the interior ministry, only one set of regulations had 
been drafted and 15 others were hastily cobbled together as 
the date for implementation drew near. 
The opponents of devolution take the example of China 
where devolution resulted in a decline in the standard of 
public services and the process of devolution went into 
reverse. It was lack of political will that killed devolution in 
China and many observers wonder whether the same will 
happen in Indonesia. 
Law 22 and Law 25 
In May 1999, a month before the general elections, parlia-
ment enacted Law 22 on regional government and Law 25 
on financial relations between central government and the 
regions. The main provisions of Law 22 are: 
- The abolition of the hierarchical relationship between the 
central government, the provinces and the districts or cities. 
Regional heads at province and district/city level will be 
elected by the regional legislative body and will be account-
able to that body rather than to the higher level government 
(as in the past). Governors (heads of provinces) will 
continue to represent the central government but district 
chiefs (bupati) and mayors (walikota) will no longer _act as 
representatives of the central government and will be 
accountable to the local assembly and local electorate. 
- The central government is responsible for interna~ional 
relations, defence, justice, monetary and fiscal affairs. It 
will also retain overall control of national economic plan-
ning, national administration, advanced technology, human 
resource development policies and natural resource conser-
vation. 
- The districts (kabupaten) and cities (kotamadya) will 
assume responsibility for public works, health, education 
and culture, agriculture, communications, industry and 
trade, investment, environmental and land-use affairs, coop-
eratives and labour. In cases where a region is unable to 
carry out some of its functions, it may merge with another 
region or ask the provinces to take over some of the tasks. 
The main provisions of Law 25 are: 
- Grants from the central government to the regions 
(province, district and city) from the routine and develop-
ment budgets will be abolished and replaced by 'equalisa-
tion grants' (dana perimbangan) consisting of a general 
allocation (DAU, dana alokasi umum) and a special alloca-
tion (DAK, dana alokasi khusus ), receipts from land and 
building taxes (pajak bumi dan bangunan), building titles 
administration fees (Bea Perolehan Hak atas Tanah dan 
Bangunan) and a share of the revenue from natural resource 
exploitation. 
- The general allocation (DAU) will amount to at least 25 
per cent of the central government domestic revenue as 
determined in the annual state budget (APBN). The 
provinces will retain ten per cent of this allocation and the 
remaining 90 per cent will go to the districts and cities. 
Provisions are made in cases where the circumstances are 
different. The special allocation (DAK) will come from the 
central budget earmarked for special development needs in 
a region. 
- Regions will receive 15 per cent of receipts from oil 
exploitation and 30 per cent from natural gas exploitation 
within their region. They will receive 80 per cent of govern-
ment revenue from mining, forestry and fisheries. 
- Regions are permitted to borrow domestically, with the 
permission of the local assembly but overseas lending will 
need central government approval. Regional heads will be 
responsible in all financial matters to the regional assembly 
which must approve budgets and receive full reports on 
budget implementation from the relevant officials. 
As these provisions show, Law 22 introduces the critically 
important principle of local democracy in place of the top 
down system in which all authority is held by officials 
appointed from above. Greater local control of revenues 
raised from the exploitation of local resources should help 
to reduce the resentment widely felt in many regions which 
have seen virtually all the local proceeds being drain away 
to the centre. These factors alone should ensure that devolu-
tion will bring a breath of fresh air to the governance of the 
unwieldy and virtually ungovernable country called 
Indonesia. But everything depends on whether the men and 
women in power at the centre are willing to allow this exper-
iment in local autonomy to proceed. Only time will tell. * 
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PRD takes ,Suharto to court 
While efforts by the state to mount a lawsuit against Indonesia's former dictator collapsed ignomin-
iously last year, the PRD has succeeded in taking Suharto and twelve other generals to court for the 
unlawful arrest of their members in 1996. This is the only lawsuit now before a court in Indonesia 
which is exposing the human rights abuses of Suharto and his generals. 
The lawsuit was mounted last July by the Partai Rakyat 
Demokratik (the Democratic People's Party, PRD) before the 
Central Jakarta district court. The PRD is suing Suharto and 
twelve other generals for the unlawful arrest of its members 
in the aftermath of the attack on the head office of the PDI 
(Partai Democrat Indonesia) in central Jakarta. Despite chal-
lenges by the legal team of the accused, urging the court to 
refuse to allow the lawsuit to proceed, the court decided in 
late November to let the case go ahead and further hearings 
have taken place since the beginning of the year. 
Government efforts not serious 
The Wahid government has failed as yet to prepare any 
case against Suharto for his crimes against humanity. In 
2000, charges of corruption were laid against the former 
dictator but even these collapsed when the court was 
persuaded by a team of doctors that he was not fit to stand 
trial. As for charges against members of the Suharto family, 
his son Tommy was charged with corruption, found guilty 
and sentenced to 18 months but disappeared before the 
police had got round to arresting him and to this day, he is 
still in hiding. Only one of Suharto's cronies, timber tycoon 
Bob Hassan is now behind bars, serving a six-year sentence 
for malpractices with reforestation funds. 
The PRD lawsuit is therefore unique as a serious effort to 
put Suharto on trial for human rights abuses. It is the first 
attempt from within civil society to hold Suharto to account 
for human rights violations and sets a precedent for future 
efforts to deal with the grave crimes of the dictator during 
his 32-year dictatorial regime. 
The lawsuit takes as its starting point the violent onslaught 
in July 1996 against the head office in Jakarta of the PDI, 
which was then controlled by the party's democratically 
elected leader, Megawati Sukamoputri. Many people were 
killed during the attack. 
In order to legitimise the attack, the PRD, which was 
openly supportive of Megawati, was chosen as the scape-
goat because the regime feared that the party could upset 
Suharto's plans to be elected for a seventh term. A campaign 
of vilification against the PRD was launched, and it was 
accused of being the reincarnation of the PKI. 
The lawsuit describes the actions of the security forces in 
arresting and terrorising members of the PRD in Jakarta, 
Bogor (West Java), Semarang, Ungaran, Solo and 
Yogyakarta (Central Java), Gresik, Wonokromo, Surabaya, 
Malang, Mojokerto and Blitar (East Java) and names 58 
PRD activists who were arrested during August and 
September 1996. It describes the stage-managed trials of 
thirteen PRD leaders who received heavy sentences, after 
being charged under the anti-subversion law. 
Besides Suharto, those being sued include General Feisal 
Tandjung who was then commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces, Lt.General Syarwan Hamid who was sospol assistant 
of the armed forces, Major-General Syamsir Siregar who was 
head of BIA, the armed forces intelligence agency, 
Lt.General Dibyo Widodo who was Indonesia's chief of 
police, Major.General Zacky A. Makarim, a director of BIA, 
Major-General Sutiyoso who was Jakarta military comman-
der (he is now the governor of Jakarta), as well as the minis-
ter of justice, the attorney general and the minister of the inte-
nor. 
The lawsuit is seeking a decision by the court to order the 
return of confiscated PRD property and documents which 
were seized unlawfully. The PRD makes a claim for 
compensation of Rp 516 million, along with punitive 
damages of five billion rupiahs, about US$500,000. 
Speaking after the first hearing of the case in August, PRD 
chairman Budiman Sudjatmiko said: 'We want to say that 
no one who has committed crimes in the past can escape the 
law.' (Jakarta Post, 11 August) 
Witnesses testify 
Witnesses called by the plaintiffs include several members 
of the PRD, a member of the PDI and the father of the PRD 
chairman. Sandra Fertasari is a member of the PDI who 
was a witness to the attack on the head office. She told the 
court that members of the security forces did indeed take 
part in the assault; she herself saw that before taking part, 
they took off their uniforms and put on T-shirts to conceal 
their true identiy. She was later taken into police custody 
where she was subjected to sexual harassment. 
Father Sandyawan, a Jesuit priest who gave several PRD 
leaders sanctuary when they were been sought by the army 
told the court about the 'shoot-to-kill' order for activists 
issued by the Jakarta military commander, Major-General 
Sutiyoso and the allegation by General Syarwan Hamid that 
the PRD was a communist organisation. Father Sandyawan, 
who then headed the Jakarta Social Institute, was a member 
of an investigation team which conducted an investigation 
into the attack on the PDI office. 
Budiman's father, H. Wartono Karya Utomo, told the court 
that he and his family had been subjected to terror and 
intimidation by members of the security forces while his 
son was being hounded. His home in Bogor was raided by 
the army and he himself was accused of being a member of 
the outlawed PKI which was a complete fabrication. This 
allegation led to his being sacked from his job at the Good 
Year factory. * 
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Whither civilian supremacy in Indonesia? 
When Abdurrahman Wahid was elected president of Indonesia in October 1999 after democratically 
held elections, there were high hopes that after more than three decades of military dictatorship, the 
country was now on the path towards root and branch reform of the corrupted state and a gradual 
progress towards democratisation. Recent developments have dashed these hopes and place the reform 
agenda in serious jeopardy. 
We have always argued that the essential ingredient for this 
to succeed is that the military role in political and security 
matters must end and civilian supremacy must prevail. For 
the first few months of Wahid's presidency, things appeared 
to be moving in that direction as Wahid removed key hard-
liners in the military from positions of power. However, 
right from the start, there was no progress in pushing ahead 
with a reform programme to repeal repressive laws, to over-
haul key state institutions such as the judiciary or to start 
solving the deep-rooted social conflicts afflicting so many 
parts of the archipelago that had been inherited from the 
Suharto era. 
Instead, the political elite who had schemed to catapult 
Wahid to the presidency became embroiled in incessant in-
fighting over the spoils of office. Indonesia's democratically 
elected parliament has failed to focus on the grave social 
and economic problems facing the country and has instead 
become bogged down in a senseless power struggle over the 
presidency. Corruption is rife within the legislature, and 
what is even worse, the leading parties have all built 
alliances with elements within the military. 
In the early post-Suharto years, the military was weak and 
divided and gravely compromised by its record of repres-
sion and egregious human rights abuses which, to this day, 
have gone unpunished. The weak and faltering position of 
the military provided the political establishment with a 
window of opportunity to end its role but with other, more 
important things on their minds, the military have been able 
to reverse their fortunes and now pose a real threat to civil-
ian supremacy. How did this come about? 
TNI again in the ascendant 
Although investigations into the military's role in the 
mayhem in East Timor in 1999 which destroyed the infra-
structure, left hundreds dead and tens of thousands stranded 
as refugees across the border in West Timor, exposed the 
top-level military figures responsible for these crimes 
against humanity, the military and political establishments 
have rallied to protect the culprits. The long-awaited trials 
are farther from realisation than ever. 
The government has shown its inability and lack of politi-
cal will to resolve grave social conflicts in Maluku and most 
recently in Central Kalimantan. Although the security 
forces have themselves been implicated in these conflicts 
or, in the case of C. Kalimantan, allowed mass killings to 
proceed unhindered, the army is now using these tragedies 
to demand that their security functions be restored because 
of the ineffectiveness of the police. Although the police was 
separated from the anned forces two years ago, hopes for a 
civilian police force are receding. 
But the main battle over the role of the military is being 
played out in West Papua and Aceh. Wahid's policy of 
dialogue has been reversed. As several articles in this issue 
show, the TNI has regained the ascendant, with the complic-
ity of the political elite, to impose a heavy-handed military 
'solution'. When it comes to defending Indonesia's territory 
integrity, they all pull together, regardless of the conse-
quences for the people in these territories .. 
As we were going to press, the military secured the agree-
ment of the Wahid cabinet and of parliament to launch a 
'limited' military operation in Aceh even though the 
dialogue process is supposedly still in progress. Three 
specially-trained battalions have been dispatched with 
orders to 'wipe out' GAM which can only have dire conse-
quences for the civilian population. By means of this coup 
de grace, the TNI has become the pivotal security and polit-
ical force while Wahid devotes his waning energies on what 
is a probably a futile battle for political survival. Civilian 
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